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I. INTRODUCTION 
Personnel recovery is no longer limited to high-risk, specialized 
troops as was the case in the past . . . . Isolated personnel now 
include U.S. military, contractors and other government 
civilians, as well as coalition partners.1 
  LTG Norton Schwartz 
 
Providing adequate protection, antiterrorism (AT)2 training 
and, if necessary, personnel recovery3 for civilian contractors 
1. Roxana Tiron, Pentagon Still Undecided on Polices to Protect Contractors, NAT’L 
DEF., Nov. 2004, at 39. 
2. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 40 (2001, 
amended edition 2005) (defining antiterrorism as “[d]efensive measures used to reduce 
the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response 
and containment by local military forces”) [hereinafter DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND 
ASSOCIATED TERMS]. “The proactive, preventative stage to stopping terrorism, 
antiterrorism includes techniques designed to harden potential high-profile targets (e.g., 
government buildings or military installations), as well as actions taken to detect a 
planned terrorist attack before it occurs.” JEFFREY F. ADDICOTT, TERRORISM LAW: THE 
RULE OF LAW AND THE WAR ON TERROR 19 (Lawyers & Judges Publishing Company, 
2004). 
3. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 2310.2, PERSONNEL RECOVERY para. 3.1 
(2000) (defining personnel recovery as the “aggregation of military, civil, and political 
efforts to recover captured, detained, evading, isolated or missing personnel from 
uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas”). The Defense Prisoner of 
War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) defines personnel recovery as, “[t]he aggregation 
of military, civil, and political efforts to recover captured, detained, evading, isolated, or 
missing personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas.” DEF. 
PRISONER OF WAR/MISSING PERS. OFFICE, PERSONNEL RECOVERY DEFINITION, DEFENSE 
POW/MISSING PERSONNEL OFFICE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE FACT SHEET, 
http://www.dtic.mil/dpmo/personnel_recovery/fact_sheets.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2006) 
[hereinafter DPMO]. “Personnel recovery may occur through military action, action by 
non-governmental organizations, other U.S. Government (USG)-approved action, and 
diplomatic initiatives, or through any combination of these options.” Id. See also 
DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS, supra note 2, at 409 (noting that 
personnel recovery “includes but is not limited to theater search and rescue; combat 
search and rescue; search and rescue; survival, evasion, resistance, and escape; evasion 
and escape; and the coordination of negotiated as well as forcible recovery options”). 
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deployed to support U.S. military operations presents significant 
legal and policy challenges that both the military and civilian 
contractor companies have yet to fully appreciate, let alone 
properly institutionalize.4 Although many Americans still 
visualize the U.S. military as a monolithic force of uniformed 
personnel only, the reality is far different. Due to federally 
imposed personnel limitations for the armed forces and the need 
for specialized skills in the modern high-tech military,5 
hundreds of activities once performed by the military are now 
privatized and outsourced to thousands of civilian contractors.6 
These civilian contractors routinely provide a wide array of 
important and essential activities in support of the full range of 
military operations to include infrastructure improvements and 
rebuilding.7 In other words, civilian contractors now work 
shoulder-to-shoulder with military personnel during both armed 
conflict and in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).8 
While armed conflict refers to traditional combat operations 
associated with internationally recognized warfare, MOOTWs 
are contingency9 missions that include activities such as 
4. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-695, MILITARY OPERATIONS: 
CONTRACTORS PROVIDE VITAL SERVICES TO DEPLOYED FORCES BUT ARE NOT 
ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED IN DOD PLANS (2003) (recommending that DOD adopt a series 
of proposals to improve DOD supervision of support contractors including “(1) conducting 
required reviews to identify mission essential services provided by contractors and 
include them in planning; (2) developing and implementing the use of standard language 
for contracts; and (3) developing comprehensive guidance and doctrine to help the 
services manage contractors’ supporting deployed forces”) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
5. See OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 135 (Maj. Derek I. Grimes ed., The Judge 
Advocate General’s Legal Center & School, 2005) [hereinafter OPLAW HANDBOOK]. 
6. Id. at 135. The term contractor personnel “does not include those persons who 
reside in the country where the contract performance takes place.” Id. 
7. See Gordon L. Campbell, Contractors on the Battlefield: The Ethics of Paying 
Civilians to Enter Harm’s Way and Requiring Soldiers to Depend on Them, JOINT 
SERVICES CONF. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Jan. 27–28, 2000, available at 
http://www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/JSCOPE00/Campbell00.html (noting that “[c]ontractor 
support is an essential, vital part of our force projection capability—and [it is] increasing 
in its importance”). 
8. See OPLAW HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 57. 
9. See DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS, supra note 2, at 117 
(defining a contingency as “[a]n emergency caused by natural disasters, terrorists, 
subversives, or by required military operations”). “Due to the uncertainty of the 
situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response and special procedures to ensure 
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combating terrorism, counter-narcotic operations, peacekeeping 
operations, and other high-risk missions around the globe.10 
One of the consequences of the global War on Terror11 is that 
the safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment.” Id. 
10. See OPLAW HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 57 (stating that MOOTW operations 
include: Arms Control, Combating Terrorism, DOD Support to Counterdrug Operations, 
Enforcement of Sanctions/Maritime Intercept Operations, Enforcing Exclusion Zones, 
Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight, Humanitarian Assistance, Military 
Support to Civilian Authorities, Nation Assistance/Support to Counterinsurgency, 
Noncombat Evacuation Operations, Peace Operations, Protection of Shipping, Recovery 
Operations, Show of Force Operations, Strikes and Raids, and Support to Insurgency). 
11. The term “War on Terror” or “Global War on Terrorism” is used to describe the 
ongoing global conflict between the United States of America and the al-Qa’eda terror 
network founded by Osama bin Laden. See President George W. Bush, Address Before a 
Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of 
September 11, 37 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1347, 1348 (Sept. 20, 2001) (citing al-Qa’eda 
and the nations that support that “radical network of terrorists” as the enemy in the 
United States’ “war on terror”). While it is now certain that the al-Qa’eda network 
declared “war” on the United States in a 1996 “Fatwa,” for most Americans the pivotal 
moment in the conflict is traced to September 11, 2001, when nineteen members of the 
terrorist al-Qa’eda organization hijacked four domestic U.S. passenger jet aircraft while 
in flight (five terrorists in three of the planes and four in the fourth). See Terrorists 
Destroy World Trade Center, Hit Pentagon in Raid With Hijacked Jets; Nation Stands in 
Disbelief and Horror; Streets of Manhattan Resemble War Zone Amid Clouds of Ash, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2001, at A1 (describing the events leading up to the 9/11 attacks) 
[hereinafter Terrorists Destroy World Trade Center]; Evan Thomas, A New Date of 
Infamy, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 13, 2001, at 22 (creating a timeline of the atrocities and 
events that occurred on September 11, 2001); Nancy Gibbs, If You Want to Humble an 
Empire, TIME, Sept. 14, 2001, at 32 (recounting the actions of leaders of the federal 
government and New York City mayor Rudolph Giuliani in response to the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001). The terrorists crashed two of the aircraft into the twin 
towers of the World Trade Center in New York. See Terrorists Destroy World Trade 
Center, supra, at A1. A third plane hit the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., but the fourth 
plane crashed into a field in Pennsylvania, most likely a result of the efforts of some of 
the passengers. Id. at A12; see also Dave Barry, On Hallowed Ground, MIAMI HERALD, 
Sept. 7, 2002 (chronicling the exploits of the passengers of United Airlines Flight 93, who 
“transformed themselves from people on a plane into soldiers . . . [which] made them 
heroes, immediately and forever, to a wounded, angry nation . . . that desperately 
wanted to fight back”). According to a New York Times tally, along with billions of dollars 
in property loss, approximately 3,047 were killed, not including the nineteen terrorists. 
See A Nation Challenged; Dead and Missing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2002, at A13; see also 
Thomas J. Lueck, City Compiles List of Dead and Missing From Sept. 11, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 20, 2002, at B1 (reporting on the New York City medical examiner’s official list of 
2819 people who were killed or missing in the attack on the World Trade Center, 
prepared for the one-year observance at ground zero). The Bush Administration has 
repeatedly indicated that the War on Terror also encompasses appropriate action against 
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American and coalition contractors—particularly in Iraq12 and 
Afghanistan13—are increasingly subjected to kidnappings, 
torture,14 and murder by terrorists, criminal elements, and other 
those rogue States who pose a threat to the United States with the possession or desired 
possession of weapons of mass destruction. See President George W. Bush, supra note 
11, at 1349 (declaring “[f]rom this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or 
support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime”). The 
concern being that these dictatorships, like the current Iranian regime, might provide 
weapons of mass destruction to terrorist operatives. See President George W. Bush, 
Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 38 WKLY. 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 133, 135 (January 29, 2002) (proclaiming that “[t]he United States of 
America will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the 
world’s most destructive weapons”); see also THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002) (enumerating the so-
called Bush Doctrine, which adopts the use of preemptive force in self-defense and is 
designed to prevent the marriage of al-Qa’eda-styled terrorism with weapons of mass 
destruction). 
12. See Charles M. Madigan, Fast, Furious, Relentless Lightning-Quick Campaign 
Ousts Hussein in 4 Weeks, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 20, 2003, at C1 (discussing the initial success 
of the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq). Dubbed Operation Iraqi Freedom, the multinational 
operation in Iraq began on March 19, 2003, and major combat operations against 
Saddam Hussein’s forces ended on May 1, 2003. See Dana Milbank & Bradley Graham, 
Bush Revises Views On ‘Combat‘ in Iraq; ‘Major Operations‘ Over, President Says, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 19, 2003, at A15 (reporting on President Bush’s May 1, 2003, declaration that 
“[m]ajor combat operations in Iraq [had] ended”); President George W. Bush, Address to 
the Nation on Iraq from the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln, 39 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 516, 
516 (May 1, 2003). 
13. See, e.g., James Risen, A Nation Challenged: Al Qaeda; Bin Laden Aide 
Reported Killed by U.S. Bombs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2001, at A1. The multinational 
military campaign to dislodge the Taliban and al-Qa’eda took less than three months, 
from October 7, 2001 to December 23, 2001. See Michael R. Gordon, Gains and Limits in 
a New Low-Risk War, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2001, at A1 (noting that “[t]he military 
campaign in Afghanistan was a striking success for a new style of warfare,” which 
“enabled the United States to topple the Taliban, install a friendly government and 
ensure that Al Qaeda could no longer use Afghanistan as a base for terrorism”); 
Military: Operation Enduring Freedom-Operations, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom-ops.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 
2006) (further stating that approximately 6500 air combat missions were flown, which 
attacked over 120 fixed targets). Four hundred vehicles were destroyed and an 
undetermined number of combatants were killed. Id. The multinational military 
campaign was dubbed Operation Enduring Freedom. Id. 
14. See, e.g., Melinda Liu, •Help Me! I’m a Hostage!’, NEWSWEEK, June 16, 2005, 
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/8234978/site/newsweek/from/RL.5/ (reporting the rescue of a 
kidnapped Australian contractor); Ellen Knickemeyer & Jonathan Finer, In Iraq, 425 
Foreigners Estimated Kidnapped Since 2003, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 2005, at A28 
(suggesting that abductions in Iraq are far more common than previously thought). See 
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insurgency forces.15 Without question, civilian contractors will 
continue to be integral participants in the ongoing War on 
Terror.16 Therefore, it is imperative that issues of force 
protection,17 AT training, and personnel recovery18 be fully 
delineated and the related legal contours be more clearly 
defined.19 This is particularly important in light of the ever-
Matthew Lippman, The Development and Drafting of the United Nations Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 17 
B.C. INT’L & COMP L. REV. 275, 290 (1994) (discussing the international community’s 
development of the concept of freedom from torture as “a core right which was not to be 
compromised, even in times of public emergency”); see also United Nations Convention 
Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/46 
(Dec. 10, 1984) (defining torture as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether 
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining 
from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a 
third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or 
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, 
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity”). 
15. See, e.g., THOMAS HAMILL & PAUL T. BROWN, ESCAPE IN IRAQ: THE THOMAS 
HAMILL STORY 4 (2004) [hereinafter THOMAS HAMILL STORY] (relating that “[r]oadside 
bombs, improvised from discarded Iraqi artillery shells and bombs—detonated by remote 
control—and hit-and-run ambush with rocket-propelled grenades and automatic 
weapons fire increasingly became hazards of the road”). 
16. Civilian contractors are now frequent victims of violence in war zones. See, e.g., 
Daniel Bergner, The Other Army, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Aug. 14, 2005, at 29, 34 
(“Between January and August 2004 . . . Triple Canopy teams came under attack 40 
times, in incidents ranging from incoming rounds of rocket-propelled grenades to 
assaults lasting at least 24 hours.”); Jeffrey Gettleman, 4 From U.S. Killed in Ambush in 
Iraq; Mob Drags Bodies, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2004, at A1 (discussing the March 2004 
ambush, killing, and mutilation of four American contractors working for Blackwater 
Security Consulting Company). These contractors were providing security services for 
food delivery operations in the Fallujah area of Iraq. Id. Noncontractor civilians also face 
grave danger in war zones and hostile territories. See, e.g., Sewell Chan & Eunjung Cha, 
American Beheaded on Web Video; Militants Say Killing Was Revenge for U.S. Abuses at 
Iraqi Prison, WASH. POST, May 12, 2004, at A1 (discussing the travels and subsequent 
execution of Nicholas Berg, a twenty-six-year-old who journeyed to Iraq independently to 
pursue potential business opportunities). 
17. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INST. NO. 3020.41, CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL 
AUTHORIZED TO ACCOMPANY THE U.S. ARMED FORCES para. 4.4 (2005) [hereinafter DOD 
INST. NO. 3020.41]. 
18. Id. para. 6.3.6. 
19. Interestingly, a number of contracting firms have come out in support of 
greater oversight and regulation of their activities by their own government and the 
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evolving nature of terrorism20 and the attendant responses. 
Both the Department of Defense (DOD)21 and the companies 
that provide civilian contractors have core moral and legal 
responsibilities to provide contract personnel with adequate 
security, AT training,22 and, in certain circumstances, rescue 
United Nations, if necessary. Bergner, supra note 16, at 56. These firms would “like 
checks on everything from adequate training to human rights violations. They’d like to 
see their more rash competitors lose their contracts. They’d like to legitimize the work, to 
remove the remaining stigma that their own men are rogues, mercenaries.” Id. (emphasis 
added). 
20. There exists no universally accepted definition on terrorism, despite numerous 
submissions of draft proposals by United Nations Commissions and Subcommissions 
regarding the definition of terrorism. See e.g., 1954 Draft Code of Offenses Against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind, 9 U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 11–12, U.N. Doc 
A/2693 (1954). The International Law Commission’s 1954 Draft Code of Offenses Against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind (1954) contained the following proposed language at 
Article 2, para. 6.: “The undertaking or encouragement by the authorities of a State of 
terrorist activity in another State, or the toleration by the authorities of a State of 
organized activities calculated to carry out terrorist acts in another State.” Id. 
Unfortunately, as of this writing, the U.N. General Assembly has not been able to reach 
agreement on a final version. But see ADDICOTT, supra note 2, at 4 (arguing that the 
intentional targeting of non-combatants is always a terrorist act regardless of the 
underlying motivation or cause): 
Since the victims of terrorism are invariably innocent civilians, it appears 
fundamentally logical that a definitional approach should concentrate on the 
act and not the political, religious, or social causes which motivate the act. 
Under this regime, the use of violence on a civilian target with intent to 
cause fear in a given civilian population is easily classified as a terrorist act. 
In other words, to the common understanding of the general public, 
terrorism is immediately associated with violence that is directed at the 
indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians to create a climate of fear . . . . 
In this light, bombings of public places, the sending of letter bombs or 
poisons through the mails, hijackings of aircraft, hostage taking, and so on, 
are all acts of terrorism regardless of the underlying cause said to justify the 
attack. In a sense, terrorism can simply be described as making “war” on 
civilians. 
Id. 
21. Rudi Williams, DOD Official Outlines Personnel-Recovery Work to Be Done, AM. 
FORCES PRESS SERV., Aug. 31, 2004 (quoting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
Jerry D. Jennings that a pending National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) will 
clarify policy “by directing the full integration of U.S. diplomatic, civil, and military 
personnel recovery capabilities into a national architecture to ensure successful 
outcomes for personnel-recovery events”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
22. See DOD INST. NO. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 6.2.7.9. 
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from capture.23 In tandem with identifying the legal and policy 
considerations associated with these issues, this Article will also 
address the matter of civil liability to the parent contracting 
company should it fail to provide adequate protection, or 
appropriate AT training, or both, to their civilian employees 
serving overseas in hostile environments.24 
II. HISTORY AND STATUS OF CONTRACTORS ON THE 
BATTLEFIELD 
No one knows better than I the tremendous work that Brown and 
Root25 has done in Somalia. The flexibility and competence 
demonstrated by your employees were key factors in allowing 
U.S. forces to transition logistical support to the U.N. . . .26 
 General John M. Shalikashvili 
 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 
 
The military’s use of civilian defense contractors certainly 
did not begin with the military campaigns and counter-terror 
operations27 in Afghanistan and Iraq.28 Since the inception of the 
23. See Interagency National Personnel Recovery Architecture: Final Report, INST. 
FOR DEF. ANALYSES, P-3890 July 2004 [hereinafter IDA Report]; see also GAO REPORT, 
supra note 4; Dana Priest & Mary Pat Flaherty, Under Fire, Security Firms Form an 
Alliance, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 2004, at A1 (noting that “[u]nder assault by insurgents 
and unable to rely on U.S. and coalition troops for intelligence or help under duress, 
private security firms in Iraq have begun to band together . . . organizing what may 
effectively be the largest private army in the world, with its own rescue teams and 
pooled, sensitive intelligence”). 
24. See Williams, supra note 21. Hopefully, many of these issues will be resolved in 
a pending National Security Presidential Directive set to be released in late 2005. 
25. Brown and Root, a division of Halliburton, is a large government contractor 
working especially in Iraq on a variety of reconstruction projects and other DOD support 
operations. See Halliburton Iraq Contract Queried, BBC NEWS, May 30, 2003, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2950154.stm; Jane Mayer, CONTRACT SPORT, 
What Did the Vice President Do for Halliburton, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 16, 2004, at 80. 
26. David L. Young, Planning: The Key to Contractors on the Battlefield, ARMY 
LOGISTICIAN, May–June 1999, at 10. 
27. Most of the operations are directed at combating the al-Qa’eda terror 
organization or like-minded extremists. Dedicated to the destruction of the West, al-
Qa’eda has demonstrated over the past four years that it is truly international in scope 
with the resources and personnel to coordinate sophisticated terror attacks on a scale 
never before seen. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES xvi (2004) (describing 
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American republic over 200 years ago, civilian contractors have 
provided a wide array of essential goods and services to military 
personnel operating both in garrison and in the field.29 The role 
of and need for contractor support began to expand greatly 
during the war in Vietnam30 and has dramatically increased in 
the War on Terror.31 With the accelerated use of civilian 
the terror network as “sophisticated, patient, disciplined, and lethal”) [hereinafter 9/11 
REPORT]; Michael Elliott, Why the War on Terror Will Never End, TIME, May 26, 2003, at 
27, 29–30 (noting that the terror network of al-Qa’eda is linked to a vast variety of like-
minded terrorist groups from the Philippines to Indonesia and has trained tens of 
thousands of Arab and non-Arab militants in Afghanistan under the Taliban regime). 
The al-Qa’eda organization is entrenched in Iraq under Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab 
al-Zarqawi and still operates, although clandestinely, in Afghanistan. See Henry 
Schuster, Al-Zarqawi and al Qaeda in Jordan, CNN, Nov. 12, 2005, 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/11/11/zarqawi.jordan/; Elliott, supra, at 29. 
28. See P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military 
Industry and Its Ramifications for International Security, 26 INT’L SECURITY 3, at 186, 
188–90 (Winter 2001/2002). 
29. See Campbell, supra note 7 (noting that the use of contractors during wartime 
spans all the way back to the Revolutionary War, when General “Washington used 
civilian wagon drivers to haul supplies”). It should be noted that most contracting 
companies reject the accusation that they are mere mercenaries. See Bergner, supra note 
16, at 31 (noting that security contracting companies, placing great importance on public 
perception of their work, prefer the term “private security company,” or P.S.C., over less 
accurate and politically charged terminology). 
30. See James J. McCullough & Abram J. Pafford, Contractors on the Battlefield: 
Emerging Issues for Contractor Support in Combat & Contingency Operations, in 
BRIEFING PAPERS, June 2002, at 1 (West 2002); see also Campbell, supra note 7 
(explaining that “[b]y Vietnam, contractors were becoming a major part of logistical 
capabilities within zones of operation providing construction, base operations, water and 
ground transportation, petroleum supply and . . . support for high-technology systems”). 
31. See GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 2–9; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-95-5, DOD FORCE MIX ISSUES: GREATER RELIANCE ON CIVILIANS IN 
SUPPORT OF ROLES COULD PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT BENEFITS (1994) (stating that “[w]ith 
the transition to an all-volunteer active-duty military force, DOD adopted the ‘Total 
Force’ policy in 1973, which recognized that the reserves, retired military members, 
civilian government workers, and private contractor personnel could add to the active 
forces in ensuring the national defense”); Steven L. Schooner, Contractor Atrocities at 
Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in a Streamlined, Outsourced Government, 16 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 549, 554 (2005) (noting that, in Iraq, the military relies on civilian 
contractors “for unprecedented levels of battlefield and weaponry operation, support, and 
maintenance”); Bergner, supra note 16, at 32 (reporting that, in 2002, the United States 
hired a private security detail of roughly forty men from DynCorp to protect Afghan 
President Hamid Karzai from attacks and assassination attempts). For example, 
security contracting “businesses add about 16 percent to the coalition’s total forces.” Id. 
at 31. 
ADDICOTT FINAL FORMATTED - EIC EDITS 3/6/2006 11:18 AM 
332 HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 28:2 
                                                          
contractors who accompany the military, the issue of status 
looms as a central matter of concern. Are they combatants, 
noncombatants, or a hybrid?32 
A. Scope of Contractor Support 
Civilians accompanying military forces,33 also known in the 
DOD lexicon as contractors deploying with the force (CDF),34 fall 
into three broad categories, each governed by somewhat 
different legal and regulatory guidance. These three categories 
are: DOD civilian employees,35 civilian contractor personnel, and 
other nonaffiliated civilians.36 As the primary topic of interest of 
these three categories, civilian contractor personnel includes: 
“Any individual, firm, corporation, partnership, association, or 
other legal nonfederal entity that enters into a contract directly 
with the [DOD] to furnish services, supplies, or both, including 
construction.”37 In addition, many of the civilian contractors who 
accompany the military on contingency operations are 
designated as “mission-essential” (M-E) personnel38 (similar to 
the designation of DOD civilian employees as “emergency-
essential” personnel).39 In essence, an M-E contractor is someone 
32. See DOD INST. NO. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 6.1.1. 
33. Many military publications refer to contractors accompanying the military 
overseas as “CAF,” an acronym for “Contractors Accompanying the Force.” See OPLAW 
HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 135. 
34. See DOD INST. NO. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 1. 
35. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INST. NO. 1300.23 (defining DOD civilian employees as 
“U.S. citizens or foreign nationals employed by the [DOD] and paid from appropriated or 
non appropriated funds under permanent or temporary arrangement”) [hereinafter DOD 
INST. NO. 1300.23]. 
36. See Lisa L. Turner & Lynn G. Norton, Civilians at the Tip of the Spear, 51 A.F. 
L. REV. 1, 4 & n.9 (2001) (describing nonaffiliated persons as the media, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private voluntary organizations (PVOs) refuges, 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
[hereinafter Turner & Norton]. 
37. See DOD INST. NO. 1300.23, supra note 35, para. E1.1.2. 
38. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INST. NO. 3020.37, CONTINUATION OF 
ESSENTIAL DOD CONTRACTOR SERVICES DURING CRISIS (1990). 
39. In contrast to civilian contractors, DOD civilian employees can be designated as 
emergency-essential personnel. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 1404.10, 
EMERGENCY-ESSENTIAL (E-E) DOD U.S. CITIZEN CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES para. 6 (1992). An 
E-E employee is expected to sign a “[DOD] Civilian Employee Overseas Emergency-
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who works in a position in an overseas contingency operation 
that is required to ensure the success of the operation. 
Given the scope and pace of the modern military, military 
planners no longer consider civilian contractors a luxury or a 
“nice to have” addition to the force structure.40 Indeed, 
contractors accompanying the military on operations are a 
necessity without which the modern military could not conduct 
combat or engage in MOOTW. Because contractors now provide 
a wide range of technical, logistical, maintenance, and security 
support services to DOD missions,41 America’s unparalleled 
military superiority now requires contractor support to maintain 
military readiness and operational capabilities.42 As noted, 
governmental limits on the number of DOD personnel 
authorized in a particular area,43 the increasing sophistication of 
military technologies,44 and the ever-present need to conserve 
DOD resources for other potential activities makes contractor 
personnel support vital.45 Working for American contractor 
companies under DOD contracts, thousands of engineers, 
technicians, construction workers, food service providers, and 
Essential Position Agreement.” Id. para. E2.1.4. 
40. See Campbell, supra note 7 (arguing that contractor support to the military is 
an absolutely essential part of force projection). 
41. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-95-5, supra note 31, Ch. 
0:2. 
42. See Anthony Bianco & Stephanie Anderson Forest, Outsourcing War, BUS. 
WK., Sept. 15, 2003, at 68 (highlighting that “[b]y most estimates, civilian contractors 
are handling as much as 20% to 30% of essential military support services in Iraq”); 
Matthew Quirk, Private Military Contractors: A Buyer’s Guide, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 
Sept. 2004, at 39 (noting that there are ten times as many contractors per military 
soldier in Iraq in 2004 as compared to the 1991 Gulf War). 
43. Force Caps limit DOD personnel that may be committed to a particular 
location, combat zone, or mission. See HEADQUARTERS DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD 
MANUAL 100-21, CONTRACTORS ON THE BATTLEFIELD para. 1-3 (2003), available at 
http://www.afsc.army.mil/gc/files/fm3_100x21.pdf [hereinafter FM 100-21] (“When 
military force caps are imposed on an operation, contractor support can give the 
commander the flexibility of increasing his combat power by substituting combat units 
for military support units.”). 
44. Sophisticated weapons systems may require contractors to operate the system, 
train military personnel on their operation, or both. But see infra footnotes 108–20 and 
accompanying text (noting that contractors may not operate weapons systems). 
45. See GAO REPORT, supra note 4. 
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weapon specialists make up a “privatized Army.”46 This 
privatized Army is currently deployed closer than ever before to 
imminently dangerous areas, including the actual battlefield.47 
To be sure, this fact has resulted in untoward consequences. 
Tragically, as of January 2005, over 200 civilian contractors 
working in Iraq (many of them Americans) have been killed, 
with hundreds more wounded.48 
Furthermore, relative to the size of the uniformed armed 
forces during the Cold War, today’s active duty military is a 
significantly smaller force.49 This increases the importance of 
contractor support to maintain the overall flexibility of the 
active and reserve forces.50 While no one really knows exactly 
how many civilian contractors are currently supporting DOD 
contingency operations overseas,51 low ranging estimates reveal 
46. Mark Fineman, Privatized Army in Harm’s Way, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2003, at 
A1 (noting that “[t]housands of unarmed American engineers, technicians, electricians, 
weapons specialists and retired military officers working for U.S. corporations under 
Defense Department contracts are deployed closer to present and imminent war zones 
than ever before”). 
47. Id. 
48. See Joseph Neff & Jay Price, Iraq: Courts to Resolve Contractor’s Deaths, NEWS 
& OBSERVER, Jan. 9, 2005, available at http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=11781; 
but see Bergner, supra note 16 (noting the impossibility of accurately reporting how 
many security contractors have been killed in Iraq due to a failure on the part of 
contracting companies to report the deaths). Still, experts estimate that between 160 and 
200 security contractors have been killed in Iraq—”more deaths than any one of 
America’s coalition partners have suffered.” Id. In addition, “[t]here have been more than 
150 reported kidnappings in [Iraq] in the last year, most of them involving Iraqi 
citizens.” Solomon Moore, U.S. Contractor Kidnapped in Iraq; His Identity, That of Firm 
Withheld, LA. TIMES, April 12, 2005, at A3. 
49. See Michael E. Guillory, Civilianizing the Force: Is the United States Crossing 
the Rubicon?, 51 A.F. L. REV. 111, 111 (2001) (noting that the armed forces size has been 
reduced from 2,174,200 to 1,385,700 following the end of the Cold War); see also 
generally Edward F. Bruner, Military Forces: What is the Appropriate Size for the United 
States? (CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS ORDER CODE RS 21754, 
May 28, 2004), available at www.fas.org/man/crs/RS21754.pdf. 
50. See Schooner, supra note 31, at 561–64 (2005) (arguing that the military is not 
providing proper oversight to some contractors and that the line between inherently 
governmental functions and commercial activities is improperly blurred); see also 
Bergner, supra note 16 (noting that security contractors, despite denials from the 
Pentagon, often find themselves “perform[ing] inherently military functions” due to 
inadequate numbers in the U.S. fighting force in Iraq). 
51. However, the DOD has mechanisms in place for making such a determination. 
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that in Iraq alone there is approximately one civilian contractor 
for every ten active duty military personnel.52 This amounts to 
over 20,000 civilian contractors,53 a number sure to increase over 
the next few years as the pace of infrastructure support in Iraq 
(and Afghanistan) increases.54 
All civilian contractors operate under the terms of a specific 
contract,55 either directly with the DOD or as subcontracted with 
another contractor who is under contract with the DOD. The 
duties of all contractors are “established solely by the terms of 
their contract.”56 Usually, the military contract will fall into one 
of three general categories.57 First, Theater Support Contracts58 
are contracts associated with providing support59 to the regional 
combatant command,60 for instance, in Colombia, the combatant 
See Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), Contractor Personnel 
Supporting a Force Deployed Outside the United States, 70 Fed. Reg. 23,790 (Dep’t of 
Def. May 5, 2005) §§ 252.225-7040 (g)–(h) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 207, 212, 225, 
252) [hereinafter DFARS] (requiring contractor’s input to personnel data list as well as a 
plan for replacing employees who are unavailable for deployment or need to be replaced 
during a deployment). 
52. See Fineman, supra note 46. 
53. See Quirk, supra note 42 (noting that there are “ten times as many 
[contractors] per military soldier” in Iraq in 2004 as compared to the 1991 Gulf War). 
However, the actual number of civilian contractors on the ground in Iraq is subject to 
dispute. Compare id. (speculating that there are roughly 20,000 civilians in Iraq) with 
Bergner, supra note 16 (estimating that the number of unarmed civilians assisting the 
U.S. military’s efforts in Iraq ranges from 50,000 to 70,000, without counting the 25,000 
armed contractors) and Tom Regan, US Troops, Security Contractors Increasingly at 
Odds in Iraq, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 13, 2005, available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0613/dailyUpdate.html (claiming that there are between 
50,000 and 100,000 civilian contractors in Iraq, with “over 20,000 of them providing 
private security”). 
54. See Guy Taylor, Legal Limbo Shadows Civilians in War Zone, WASH. TIMES, 
July 6, 2004, at A1 (noting that “lawyers and representatives from contract firms . . . put 
the number closer to 80,000”). 
55. See DOD INST. NO. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 6.1.4. 
56. See FM 100-21, supra note 43, para. 1-6. 
57. See Campbell, supra note 7. 
58. See id. (describing theater support contractors as those “usually from the local 
vendor base, providing goods services and minor construction to meet the immediate 
needs of operational commanders”). 
59. See DOD INST. NO. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 6.3. 
60. See DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS, supra note 2, at 96 
(defining combatant command as “[a] unified or specified command with a broad 
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command is United States Southern Command. These contracts 
are typically for day-to-day recurring services at the deployed 
site, to include minor construction projects, repair parts, and 
equipment rental.61 The second type of contracts are called 
External Support Contracts and are awarded by commands 
outside the pertinent combatant command,62 such as the Defense 
Logistics Agency.63 Again, under these contracts civilian 
contractors are expected to provide services at the deployed 
locations.64 Finally, Systems Contracts—the third category of 
contracts—provide the required logistics support to maintain 
and operate weapons systems and various mechanical systems 
used in the field.65 Regardless of the type of contract, the 
realities of military exigencies necessitate that civilian contract 
personnel “shall be prepared to respond rapidly, efficiently, and 
effectively to meet mission requirements for all contingencies 
and emergencies.”66 
Furthermore, some contracts may require contractor 
personnel to be U.S. citizens, reflecting a security consideration 
continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the 
President through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff” and further noting that “[c]ombatant commands 
typically have geographic or functional responsibilities”). 
61. See Campbell, supra note 7, at 3; FM 100-21, supra note 43, para. 1-8. 
62. See Campbell, supra note 7, at 3 (“[External support contractors] work under 
contracts awarded by contracting officers serving under the command and procurement 
authority of supporting headquarters outside the theater. Their support augments the 
commander’s organic combat service support capability.”); see also FM 100-21, supra 
note 43, para. 1-9. 
63. The Defense Logistics Agency is the DOD’s “largest combat support agency, 
providing worldwide logistics support in both peacetime and wartime to the military 
services as well as several civilian agencies and foreign countries.” DEFENSE LOGISTICS 
AGENCY, FACTS AND FIGURES, ABOUT THE DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY (Jan. 10, 2006), 
http://www.dla.mil/public_info/facts.asp. The Defense Logistics Agency “supplies almost 
every consumable item America’s military services need to operate, from groceries to jet 
fuel” and has supported the U.S. military in “every major war and contingency operation 
of the past four decades,” starting with the Vietnam war. Id. 
64. See FM 100-21, supra note 43, para. 1-9. 
65. See id. para. 1-10. 
66. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 1400.31, DOD CIVILIAN WORK FORCE 
CONTINGENCY AND EMERGENCY PLANNING AND EXECUTION para. 4.1 (1995), available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d140031_042895/d140031p.pdf. 
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associated with intelligence concerns or other sensitive issues.67 
In fact, vetting contractors who might have access to particular 
DOD military sites is a necessary force-protection measure.68 For 
example, the threat posed by in-country contractors with regular 
access to coalition military facilities was vividly demonstrated in 
December 2004, at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Marez in 
Mosul, Iraq. In this tragic incident a suicide bomber penetrated 
base security measures and killed twenty-two people,69 including 
several civilian contractors.70 While the suicide bomber was not 
a civilian contractor—he was most likely a terrorist who 
disguised himself in an Iraqi military uniform71—the event 
67. 48 C.F.R. § 3052.237-70(a) (2003) (defining “Sensitive Information”). Citizenry 
or residency requirements for contract personnel are not uncommon throughout the 
military, homeland security, and law enforcement communities of the federal 
government. In December 2003, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) passed an 
interim rule requiring that some DHS contractors “be a citizen of the United States of 
America, or an alien who has been lawfully admitted for permanent residence . . . .” 
§ 3052.237-70(e). 
68. While the primary bulk of force protection measures at DOD installations 
prepare for external threats, safeguarding personnel and military assets from rogue 
contractors is equally important. The so-called “Insider Threat” scenario occurs when an 
individual is granted legitimate access to a location and then uses that access to 
facilitate sabotage or violence. Because the DOD often uses local contractors to provide 
food, housekeeping, maintenance, and even security services, preventing a hostile from 
gaining employment under the cover of a contract—and then using that access to a DOD 
installation to facilitate violence—is a security challenge that pits the necessities of 
safety and access control against the needs of military exigency, readiness, and in-
country support. See Karl Vick, Iraq Base Was Hit By Suicide Attack, U.S. General Says; 
Bomber Penetrated Tightly Secure Area, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2004, at A1 (describing 
the fact that “U.S. firms contracted to feed the troops routinely employ citizens from 
third countries, such as the Philippines, but Iraqis come on base each day to fill 
temporary jobs and or do construction work, such as building”). 
69. See George Edmonson, Evidence Points to Suicide Bomber; Base Infiltrator 
Likely Wore Device Packed with Shrapnel, U.S. Says, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Dec. 23, 
2004, at A1 (noting that four Halliburton employees were killed in the blast, including 
two from Texas, where Halliburton is based). 
70. See Bill Nichols & Dave Moniz, Suicide Bomber Blamed in Blast, USA TODAY, 
Dec. 23, 2004, at A1 (noting that the December 22, 2004 suicide bombing inside a mess 
hall at a U.S. base near Mosul would result in “a reassessment of U.S. security 
procedures . . . .” 
71. See Jackie Spinner, Bomber Likely in Iraqi Uniform; U.S. Officials Offer Theory 
in Deadly Attack on Mess Tent, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 2004, at A14 (explaining that “Iraqi 
soldiers . . . are often present on U.S. bases . . . enabling[ing] a bomber dressed in a 
uniform to move about without raising suspicion”). 
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illustrated the fact that a non-American civilian who falsely 
gained employment under the pretense of an in-country 
contractor could accomplish the same act of terrorism. 
While the United States clearly adopts international law72 
prohibiting contractors from engaging in hostilities,73 the reality 
is that contractors can be deployed throughout the battlefield, 
including forward-deployed positions (relative to enemy forces) 
to support operations during armed conflict or in other hostile 
environments associated with contingency operations.74 As 
evidenced by contractor casualties at the FOB Mosul attack,75 
civilian contractors are regularly exposed to the risks of physical 
harm similar to that of military personnel.76 An enemy that 
blends in with the civilian population is far more able to employ 
violence against support and civilian contract personnel. To 
prepare for the physical dangers inherent in such asymmetrical 
conflicts, contractors must be properly informed, trained, and 
equipped77 not only to understand their own rights and 
obligations, but also to understand those of the U.S. military 
and the parent contractor company.78 
B. Status of Contractors 
Unlike military personnel, civilian contractors 
accompanying the armed forces in the field do not fit neatly into 
well-defined arenas of military law and procedure. While the 
military has always carefully outlined its own command 
structure for its uniformed personnel, for civilians accompanying 
the forces the picture is far less certain. In fact, except in a 
72. See DOD INST. NO. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 6.1.1. 
73. See JOINT PUBLICATION 4-0, DOCTRINE FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF JOINT 
OPERATIONS, at V-1 (2000) [hereinafter JP 4-0] (“In all instances, contractor employees 
cannot lawfully perform military functions and should not be working in scenarios that 
involve military combat operations where they might be conceived as combatants.”). 
74. James E. Manker, Contractors in Contingency Operations: Panacea or Pain, 
A.F. J. OF LOGISTICS (2004), available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/ 
mi_m0ibo/is_3_28/ai_n9544154/print. 
75. See Vick, supra note 68 (noting that four of the 22 deaths in the blast were 
American civilians). 
76. Manker, supra note 74. 
77. See DOD INST. NO. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 6.3.4. 
78. See generally Campbell, supra note 7; FM 100-21, supra note 43. 
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Congressional declaration of war (which last occurred in 1941 
during World War II), civilian contractors are not subject to the 
provisions of the Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 
that is, military law.79 Not only do military commanders have 
extremely limited authority to take any type of direct 
disciplinary action against contractors to make them perform 
their duties,80 contractors are generally not required to do 
anything outside of the terms of their specific contract.81 Simply 
stated, commanders must look to the contracting officer82 for 
enforcement of the terms of the contract.83 DOD Instruction 
3020.41 in paragraph 6.1.1 entitled, “International Law and 
Contractor Legal Status” states: 
Under applicable law, contractors may support military 
operations as civilians accompanying the force, so long 
as such personnel have been designated as such by the 
force they accompany and are provided with an 
appropriate identification card under the provisions of 
the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment 
of Prisoners of War . . . . If captured during armed 
conflict, contingency contractor personnel 
79. See FM 100-21, supra note 43, para. 1-6. 
80. See DOD INST. NO. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 6.3.3. 
81. Civilian contractors may be subject to the host nation laws or be prosecuted for 
certain criminal offenses by the Department of Justice under the provisions of the 
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, 18 U.S.C. § 3261, as amended by 
§ 1008 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. 
L. No. 108-375, 118 Stat. 1811 (2004). See Turner & Norton, supra note 36, at 36, 38; 
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS); Contractor Performance 
of Security-Guard Functions, 70 FR 14,576-01 (Mar. 23, 2005) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. 
pt. 237). 
82. See DFARS, supra note 51, § 225.7402-3(b) (describing the duties of the 
contracting officer to include confirming the contract contains valid terms of agreement 
between the parties). 
83. See DOD INST. NO. 3020.41, supra note 17, at para. 6.3.3. Commanders may 
take administrative actions against civilian contractor to include revocation of security 
clearances or restriction from installations or facilities. Commanders have limited 
authority to take direct action against contractor personnel to perform their duties. In 
addition, only Department of Justice may prosecute misconduct. Contractor personnel 
are normally disciplined by the contractor through the terms of the applicable 
employment agreement. However, contracts should recognize the ability for a 
commander to take certain actions affecting contractor personnel such as the ability to 
revoke or suspend security clearances and restriction from installations or facilities. See 
id. 
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accompanying the force are entitled to prisoner of war 
status.84 
The reason for this dilemma revolves around the exact 
nature of the civilian contractor vis-à-vis the concept of armed 
conflict. To begin with, traditional international law has focused 
sharply on the distinction between international and internal 
armed conflict with most of the concern to the former. Even 
under the international laws of war, the precise status of 
contractors is still the subject of some debate.85 The current 
corpus of the law of war,86 which consists of all laws created by 
treaty and customary principles87 that are applicable to 
international warfare, is largely encompassed by the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions.88 The Geneva Conventions serve as the primary 
source of law in the event of an international armed conflict.89 
While the Geneva Conventions require all militaries to 
distinguish between combatants (armed forces) and 
84. See DOD INST. NO. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 6.1.1. 
85. See Turner & Norton, supra note 36, at 9 (noting that not all civilian 
contractors will be afforded protection upon capture, under the Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War). Phillip Carter, Hired Guns: What to Do 
About Military Contractors Run Amok, SLATE, Apr. 9, 2004, available at 
http://www.slate.com/id/2098571. 
86. The basic goal of the law of war is to limit the impact of the inevitable evils of war 
by: “[1] [p]rotecting both combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering; [2] 
[s]afeguarding certain fundamental human rights of persons who fall into the hands of the 
enemy, particularly prisoners of war, the wounded and sick, and civilians; and [3] 
[f]acilitating the restoration of peace.” DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF 
LAND WARFARE para. 2 (1956). 
87. Customary international law consists of all those binding norms practiced by 
nations. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 102 (1987). 
88. The 1949 Geneva Conventions cover four categories: (1) Geneva Convention for 
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 
August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; (2) Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of 
Armed Forces at Sea, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; (3) Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; and (4) Geneva Convention Relative to the Protections of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
89. See John Cerone, Status of Detainees in International Armed Conflict, and 
Their Protection in the Court of Criminal Proceedings, ASIL INSIGHTS, Jan. 2002, 
available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh81.htm. 
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noncombatants (civilians),90 civilian contractors are neither 
combatants nor noncombatants in the traditional sense of the 
terms. Contractors are simply civilians that are authorized to 
accompany regular military forces on assorted military 
operations, including in times of international armed conflict 
(the United States’ policy is to handle all hostile adversaries 
consistent with the spirit and terms of the Geneva Conventions 
irrespective of the nature of the conflict).91 
When taking a broader meaning of the term “non-
combatant”, that is, the general civilian population, the concept 
actually embraces “certain categories of persons who, although 
members of or accompanying the armed forces, enjoy special 
protected status, such as medical officers, corpsmen, chaplains, 
technical (i.e., contractor) representatives, and civilian war 
correspondents.”92 In fact, the Geneva Conventions provide that 
prisoner of war (POW) protected status is given to “[p]ersons 
who accompany the armed forces without actually being 
members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft 
crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of 
labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of the 
armed forces . . . .”93 Thus, contractors are viewed as separate 
90. See FM 100-21, supra note 43, para. 4-49; see also U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY, 
NWP 1-14M, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS § 5.3, 
(1995) [hereinafter COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK]. The term combatant and noncombatant 
have special implications on the battlefield, especially in the context of prisoner-of-war 
(POW) status. 
91. See DFARS, supra note 51, § 252.225-7040. This clause requires parent 
contracting companies to ensure that its deployed personnel are familiar with and 
comply with: 
1. United States, host country, and third country national laws; 
2. Treaties and international agreements; 
3. United States regulations, directives, instructions, policies, and 
procedures; and 
4. Orders, directives, and instructions issued by the Combatant 
Commander relating to force protection, security, health, safety, or 
relations and interaction with local nationals. 
Id. § 252.225-7040(d). 
92. See COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 90. If a noncombatant actively 
participates in armed conflict he may lose his protected status and be deemed an illegal 
combatant subject to criminal prosecution for war crimes. Id. 
93. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 4(A)(4), 
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from the general civilian population, and must be treated as 
POWs if captured by enemy forces during an international 
armed conflict.94 
As long as the civilian contractor takes no direct part in 
hostilities, he must be given POW status.95 Still, this 
noncombatant status does not insulate contractors from the 
exigencies of the battlefield, including the possibility of capture, 
injury, or death.96 This fact should always be stressed to civilian 
contractors before they are assigned to work in hostile 
environments outside of the United States. 
Furthermore, with the defeat of the radical Taliban regime97 
and the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, a state of international 
armed conflict no longer exists between the United States (and 
its allies), and Afghanistan or Iraq. In this environment, 
MOOTW, the protections of the Geneva Conventions are not 
applicable.98 In fact, the ongoing terrorist activities in Iraq and 
Afghanistan would probably not even qualify as an internal 
armed conflict.99 Although one could argue that the basic 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
94. See id. art. 4(B)(2). 
95. Id. 
96. See generally discussion, supra Part II. 
97. For an excellent umbrella definition of a totalitarian regime, see JOHN NORTON 
MOORE & ROBERT F. TURNER, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 61 (2d ed. 2005). 
A radical totalitarian regime . . . seems to blend together a mixture of a 
failing centrally planned economy, severe limitations on economic freedom, a 
one-party political system, an absence of an independent judiciary, a police 
state with minimal human rights and political freedoms at home, denials of 
the right to emigrate, heavy involvement of the military in political 
leadership, a large percentage of GNP devoted to the military sector, a high 
percentage of the population in the military, leaders strongly motivated by 
an ideology of “true beliefs” including willingness to use force, aggressively 
anti-Western and antidemocratic in behavior, and selective support for wars 
of national liberation, terrorism, and disinformation against Western or 
democratic interests. 
Id. 
98. See infra note 99. But see U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 5100.77, DOD 
LAW OF WAR PROGRAM (1998) (generally believing that the law of war should be 
applicable in all military operations; the United States will comply with the spirit and 
associated principles of the law of war on all MOOTW). 
99. The United States is not a signatory to Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of August 12, 1946, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
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protections associated with basic humanitarian law and human 
rights law100 would protect the captured contractor from abuse or 
torture, the sad reality of the War on Terror is that civilian 
contractors are often specifically targeted by terrorists who 
recognize no law whatsoever and provide no distinction between 
civilians and the military.101 Humanitarian law has no value to 
International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. Commonly known as 
Protocol I, this instrument seeks to extend coverage of non-international conflicts “in 
which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against 
racist regimes in the exercise of their rights to self-determination.” Id. art. 1.4; see also 
generally Abraham Sofaer, The U.S. Decision Not to Ratify Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions on the Protection of War Victims, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 784, 786 (1988) (arguing 
generally that Protocol I’s effect of “[t]reating . . . terrorists as soldiers . . . enhances their 
stature, to the detriment of the civilized world community”). 
100. The term “human rights” is commonly meant to include so-called first and 
second-generation human rights. See Dianne Otto, Rethinking the “Universality” of 
Human Rights Law, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1997) (noting that the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/819, Dec. 10, 1948, contains two Covenants consisting of “first” and “second” 
generation human rights). Through treaty and customary international law, first 
generation human rights are binding on all nation-states. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 (1987) (listing first 
generation human rights as: “[1] genocide, [2] slavery or slave trade, [3] the murder of, or 
causing the disappearance of, individuals, [4] torture or other cruel, inhumane or 
degrading treatment or punishment, [5] prolonged arbitrary detention, [6] systematic 
racial discrimination, and [7] a consistent pattern of committing gross violations of 
internationally recognized human rights”). Second generation human rights are legally 
binding only on those nation-states that have obligated themselves through treaty. 
These rights speak to political and civil freedoms such as the freedom of religion, 
peaceful assembly, privacy, association, fair and public trial, open participation in 
government, and movement. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 101 CONG REC. S17486-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) 
(comments of Sen. Pell) reprinted in DAVID WEISSBRODT, ET AL., SELECTED 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 282–83 (3d ed. 2001). Essentially second 
generation human rights are the functional equivalents of democratic values found in 
the United States Constitution. 
101. See Bomb Kills 4 U.S. Security Contractors in Iraq, HOUS. CHRON., Sept. 7, 
2005 (reporting on the death of four American contractors from a roadside bomb outside 
of Basra); see also THOMAS HAMILL STORY, supra note 15, at 150. When captured by 
terrorists in Iraq, Hamill noted that he was considered a solider by the terrorists: 
“What do you do?” asked the well-dressed man [Iraqi terrorist]. 
“I am a civilian contractor,” I replied. 
“You are a soldier,” pronounced the well-dressed man. “You haul supplies 
and fuel to soldiers for the trucks, tanks, and planes that bomb Fallujah.” 
“You are a soldier!” said the man in the red wrap [Iraqi terrorist]. 
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terrorists. Thus, self-defense, AT training, and personnel 
recovery policy are best viewed from the perspective of the 
adversary. In other words, will the hostile forces abide by the 
applicable legal norms and standards of civilized behavior?102 
During MOOTW, either the normative law103 of the host 
nation or any applicable Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) 
will determine the rights and privileges bestowed on civilian 
contractors while they are present in the host nation (special 
diplomatic arrangements may also exist for particular 
deployments).104 Unless a state of international armed conflict 
exists or some other set of special circumstances exist (for 
example, the United States serving in an occupation role as it 
did in Iraq and Afghanistan), the use of civilian contractors will 
be strictly limited by these parameters.105 Again, as stated in the 
June 2005 Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(DFARS): “Contractor personnel are not combatants and shall 
not undertake any role that would jeopardize their status.”106 
“No I am not a soldier,” I said. “I am here to support the military. I am a 
truck driver.” 
“You were driving military trucks, no?” said the well-dressed man. 
“Yes, I was, but I am a civilian,” I said. 
“You are a soldier,” he said. 
Id. 
102. See Evan Thomas & Stryker McGuire, Terror at Rush Hour, NEWSWEEK, 
July 18, 2005, at 29 (discussing the continuing terror attacks aimed this time at civilians 
in London on July 7, 2005). 
103. See DOD INST. NO. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 6.1.2. CDF personnel remain 
subject to U.S. law and regulations. Id. para. 6.1.3. 
104. Id. para. 6.3.3. (“Contractor personnel are subject to the domestic criminal 
laws of the [host nation] . . . absent a SOFA or international agreement to the 
contrary.”). 
105. See FM 100-21, supra note 43, para. 1-34. 
Typically, these agreements and laws affect contractor support by—Directing 
the use of host-nation resources prior to contracting with external 
commercial firms. Restricting firms or services to be contracted. Establishing 
legal obligations to the host nation (e.g., customs, taxes, vehicle registration 
and licensing, communications and facilities support, passports, inter- or 
intracountry travel, mail, work permits, and hiring of local workers). 
Prohibiting contractor use altogether. 
Id. 
106. DFARS, supra note 51, § 252.225-7040(b)(3). 
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III. FORCE PROTECTION 
The responsibility for assuring that contractors receive adequate 
force protection starts with the combatant commander, extends 
downward, and includes the contractor.107 
Department of the Army Field Manual 100-21 
 
Force protection108 does not consist of simply providing 
armed military escorts to civilian contractors; instead, it is a 
process of events that begins long before the civilian contractor 
is deployed.109 In recognition of this fact, force protection is 
defined as “actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions 
against DOD personnel, resources, facilities, and critical 
information.”110 Thus, the process of force protection clearly 
encompasses AT training to include such things as ensuring 
that civilian contractors have “an understanding of [the] threat 
and the development of a system of indications and warnings 
that will facilitate a proactive, predictive response to enemy and 
terrorist action.”111 
Force protection is a shared obligation by the military and 
the contractor company, tempered by the restriction that while 
accompanying the forces during an armed international conflict, 
civilian contractors cannot conduct force protection measures 
that would be tantamount to engaging in hostilities.112 Further, 
if armed contractors are used to provide security113 during a 
MOOTW, such activities must be spelled out in the contract and 
[r]equests for permission to arm contingency contractor 
personnel to provide security services shall be reviewed 
107. FM 100-21, supra note 43, para. 6-4. 
108. See DOD INST. NO. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 6.3.4. 
109. See FM 100-21, supra note 43, para. 6-2. “Force protection and antiterrorism 
measures are meant to confuse and deceive the enemy so that military forces and 
accompanying civilian personnel are less vulnerable from attack.” Id. 
110. Id. para. 6-1. 
111. Id. para. 6-2. “Force protection may include fortification construction, 
electronic countermeasures, integrated air defense coverage, NBC [nuclear, biological 
and chemical] defensive measures, and rear operations to include specific antiterrorist 
actions.” Id. 
112. See id. paras. 6-1, 6-3. 
113. See DOD INST. NO. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 6.3.5. 
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on a case-by-case basis by the appropriate Staff Judge 
Advocate to the geographic Combatant Commander to 
ensure there is a legal basis for approval. The request 
will then be approved or denied by the geographic 
Combatant Commander . . . .114 
Although the responsibility for force protection “starts with 
the combatant commander, extends downward, and includes the 
contractor,”115 the exact extent of force protection afforded to the 
contractors as a general class is not entirely clear.116 Even the 
recently adopted June 2005 DFARS on contractors deployed on 
contingency operations offers only general guidance for the 
Combatant Commander.117 Of course, as a practical matter, the 
military’s failure to adequately protect the civilian contractor 
may compromise the contractor’s ability to perform the tasks (or 
terms) of the contract, thereby hampering the ability of the 
deployed military force to conduct operations. With the 
continuing cycle of violence in Iraq, some contracting companies 
have decided that the atmosphere is simply too dangerous and 
have pulled out.118 For instance, in December 2004, American 
contracting company Contrack International abandoned a $325 
million contract in which they supervised a consortium that 
rebuilt transportation infrastructure in Iraq.119 In making their 
announcement to withdraw, a Contrack spokesman confided 
that “work [in Iraq] was too dangerous and costly.”120 
114. Id. para. 6.3.5.1. 
115. FM 100-21, supra note 43, para. 6-4. 
116. See id. 
117. See DFARS, supra note 51, § 252.225-740(c). “The Combatant Commander 
will develop a security plan to provide protection, through military means, of Contractor 
personnel engaged in [a] theater of operations unless [the] terms of the contract place 
the responsibility with another party.” Id. 
118. See, e.g., Del Jones, Citing Security, U.S. Contractor Pulls Out of Rebuilding 
Project in Iraq, USA TODAY, Dec. 23, 2004, at A4 (reporting on the first instance of a 
large American contractor withdrawing reconstruction efforts in Iraq, due to cost and 
safety concerns). 
119. See id. 
120. Id. (reporting additionally that a company named Orascom, the Egyptian 
parent for Iraq’s primary mobile phone provider, was also thinking about withdrawing 
from Iraq). Orascom Chairman Naguib Sawiris related that “I’m not into the business of 
putting the lives of my people in danger.” Id. 
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A. Contractor’s Use of Firearms 
As stated, if the contract allows, the military may position 
civilian contractors anywhere in the theater of operations. While 
they can never be used in “direct support” of hostile 
operations,121 the dangers of the battlefield and the limitations of 
the military to provide adequate force protection may subject 
contractors to bodily harm, necessitating the contractors’ 
possession of firearms for self-defense.122 
DOD policy123 discourages contractor personnel from 
possessing firearms for self-defense124 (U.S. law does not 
preclude the possession of firearms for DOD employees under 
certain conditions125). If weapons are authorized,126 they must be 
a military specification sidearm (the 9mm automatic pistol) 
121. See generally Turner & Norton, supra note 36. From a legal perspective, the 
concept of direct support is not settled under either international law or U.S. policy. 
While taking up arms to engage in combat is clearly direct support, some commentators 
have argued that serving as a guard or lookout may entail direct support. Turner & 
Norton, supra note 36, at 28. The Army FM notes that: 
Civilian contractors may be employed to support Army operations and/or 
weapon systems domestically or overseas. Contractors will generally be 
assigned duties at echelons above division (EAD); EAD should be thought of 
organizationally instead of a location on a map. However, if the senior 
military commander deems it necessary, contractors may be temporarily 
deployed anywhere as needed, consistent with the terms of the contract and 
the tactical situation. 
See FM 100-21, supra note 43, para. 1-39. 
122. See Cathy Booth & Thomas Magnolia, Fear and Loathing on Iraqi Roads, 
TIME, June 7, 2004, at 40 (describing the experience of former contractor John Shane 
Ratliff). 
Once while driving, [Ratliff] took a rock to the head, which knocked him 
unconscious. His lone weapon was a can of ravioli his wife sent in a care 
package. “[The Iraqis who attacked his truck] didn’t know what [the can of 
ravioli] was, something red shaped like that . . . maybe they thought it was a 
bomb.” 
Id. In a separate incident, another former contractor described how he beat one Iraqi 
attacker to death with a hammer. Id. 
123. See DOD INST. NO. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 6.3.4.1. 
124. See JP 4-0, supra note 73, at V-7. 
125. See 10 U.S.C § 1585 (1958) (“[C]ivilian officers and employees of the 
Department of Defense may carry firearms or other appropriate weapons while assigned 
investigative duties or such other duties as the Secretary [of Defense] may prescribe.”). 
126. See DOD INST. NO. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 4.4.1. 
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utilizing military specification ammunition.127 A new draft DOD 
Instruction provides that the Combatant Commander may 
“authorize issuance of standard military side arms or 
appropriate weapons to selected contractor personnel for 
individual self-defense”128 but only on those “rare occasions when 
military force protection is deemed unavailable.”129 The June 
2005 DEFARS states that the “Combatant Commander will 
determine whether to authorize in-theater contractor personnel 
to carry weapons and what weapons will be allowed.”130 
While a hostile environment and the limits of force 
protection may favor the possession of weapons by civilian 
contract personnel, other factors may weigh against it.131 First, 
arming contractors may distort their battlefield status as 
civilians accompanying the force.132 Second, contractors—
especially those with prior military experience—may use the 
weapon in an unauthorized manner, further blurring the line 
between combatant and noncombatant.133 Furthermore, 
possession of a sidearm may cause the enemy to mistake a 
contractor for a soldier, thereby having the unintended effect of 
increasing the risk of physical harm to the contractor.134 To 
prevent accidents and misuse, contractors must be properly 
trained135 in use of firearms for self-defense only and must 
comply with all applicable local laws.136 
127. See FM 100-21, supra note 43, para. 6-29; see also Bergner, supra note 16, at 
29 (“A C.P.A. decree, which has now evolved into Iraqi law, limits the caliber and type of 
weapons that private security personnel employ[, b]ut . . . heavy machine guns and 
grenades are—perhaps by necessity—sometimes part of the arsenal.”). 
128. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DRAFT WORKING PAPER INST. NO. 4XXX.bb, MANAGEMENT 
OF CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL DURING CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS para. 6.3.5.1 (2004) 
[hereinafter DOD DRAFT INST. NO. 4XXX.bb]. 
129. Id. 
130. See DFARS, supra note 51, § 252.225-7040(j). 
131. See JP 4-0, supra note 73, at V-7. 
132. Id. 
133. See id. (stating that “[s]ince contractor personnel are not subject to command 
authority enforced by an internal system of penal discipline, commanders have no 
method of guaranteeing armed contractor personnel will act in accordance with the law 
of war or HN [Host Nation] law”). 
134. Id. 
135. See DOD INST. NO. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 6.3.5.3.4. 
136. See FM 100-21, supra note 43, para. 6-29. 
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Even if the contractor gains approval from the Combatant 
Commander to carry a sidearm in theater, the terms of the 
contract or parent-company policy may forbid it.137 In reality, 
contractors who wish to possess a firearm for self-defense must 
not only gain approval of the Combatant Commander but must 
also be authorized (or not expressly forbidden) by the terms of 
the contract under which they are employed.138 In the majority of 
cases, civilian contractors may be provided with protective 
clothing such as bulletproof vests139 and helmets,140 but few are 
ever allowed to carry firearms. 141 Additionally, in some 
circumstances, host-nation law may also prohibit contractors 
from possessing firearms.142 The exception, of course, would be 
those civilian contractors who are specifically hired to provide 
armed security protection to other civilians.143 Depending on the 
agreement with the host nation, in times of noninternational 
armed conflict, these individuals may be armed with firearms 
other than pistols.144 
137. Id.; see also DFARS, supra note 51, § 252.225-7040(i) (stating that “[s]everal 
respondents want the rule to clarify that acceptance of weapons by contractor employees 
is strictly voluntary and must be explicitly authorized by the contractor”). 
138. See FM 100-21, supra note 43, para. 6-29. 
The bayonet was the only weapon I was allowed to carry. I took it out of the 
bug-out bag every night and placed it on the table next to my bed for quick 
use in case militants broke into the camp . . . . 
Since all KBR [Kellogg, Brown & Root] employees are required to wear 
protective gear when they’re outside the camp, the next thing I reached for 
was a flak vest. When not in use, it remained next to my military-style 
Kevlar helmet . . . . 
THOMAS HAMILL STORY, supra note 15, at 28. 
139. See DOD INST. NO. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 6.2.7.6. 
140. See DFARS, supra note 51, § 252.225-7040(i). 
141. See THOMAS HAMILL STORY, supra note 15, at 28. Civilian contractor Thomas 
Hamill describes how on April 9, 2004, a terrorist attack on his truck convoy killed five 
unarmed civilian contractor drivers and left two other civilians unaccounted for. Id. at 
36, 46. 
142. See Turner & Norton, supra note 36, at 57. 
143. See Taylor, supra note 54 (quoting Addicott that “large number[s] of security 
personnel [are] hired to provide security for civilian contractors building bridges, roads 
and providing transportation”). 
144. See DFARS, supra note 51, § 252.225-7040(j)(2) (requiring the parent 
contracting company to ensure that its personnel are adequately trained in the weapon 
they are authorized to carry). 
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B. Protecting Contractors 
Army doctrine clearly provides that civilian contractors 
accompanying the force must be protected. “[T]he Army’s policy 
has become that when contractors are deployed in support of 
Army operations/weapons systems, they [contractors] will be 
provided force protection commensurate with that provided to 
DAC145 personnel.”146 Still, force protection measures necessary 
to safeguard contract personnel will vary depending on the 
circumstances, taking into account known and perceived risks.147 
This is a directly proportional relationship; a more direct threat 
requires greater force protection to safeguard contractor 
personnel.148 For instance, during military operations in Somalia 
in 1993, the risks to contract personnel supporting DOD 
operations in theater were acute—armed gangs hostile to the 
American presence and the humanitarian mission presented a 
serious threat to the safety of civilian contract personnel.149 As a 
result, some contract personnel required an armed military 
escort at all times. Conversely, other military operations present 
lower levels of threat. In the late 1990s, civilian contract 
personnel traveled “nearly 1 million miles a month on the open 
roads of Bosnia, Croatia, and Hungary . . . for the most part 
without the benefit of any force protection.”150 
In the War on Terror, ample evidence demonstrates that 
contractors, particularly those who have not received training on 
the rudimentary aspects of battlefield risks and how to manage 
them,151 are more likely the targets of kidnapping or other acts of 
violence.152 Within the general class of contractors, it is apparent 
that those without prior military experience or those who 
145. DAC is an acronym for civilians who work for the Army: Department of the 
Army Civilian. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS, http://www.fortsamhoustonmwr.com/ 
acs/acronyms_and_abbreviations.asp (last visited Feb. 5, 2006). 
146. See FM 100-21, supra note 43, para. 6-3. 
147. See Young, supra note 26. 
148. Id. at 11–12. 
149. Id. at 11. 
150. Id. 
151. See DOD INST. NO. 3020.41, supra note 17, at 6.2.7.9. 
152. See Campbell, supra note 7, at 5 (stating that “[t]he commander must protect 
his contractors—they can do little to protect themselves”). 
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operate without the benefit of weapons for self-defense are at 
the greatest risk. Nevertheless, even if the contractor is former 
military, “the currency of their conditioning, both mental and 
physical, must be taken into account.”153 
Army policy regarding contractor force protection must be 
juxtaposed more generally against Joint DOD doctrine, which 
relates to all the military services.154 Interestingly, Joint 
Publication (JP) 4-0, issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff in 2000, provides that “[f]orce protection responsibility 
for DOD contractor employees is a contractor responsibility, 
unless valid contract terms place that responsibility with 
another party . . . .”155 Consistent with JP 4-0, DOD force 
protection makes it clear that contractors are private American 
citizens and, accordingly, “[t]he Commanders do not have the 
same legal responsibility to provide security for [DOD] 
contractors as that provided for military forces or direct-hire 
employees.”156 Thus, while commanders may feel a moral or 
practical obligation to provide active and comprehensive force 
protection, in the sphere of legality, “[c]ontractors working 
within a U.S. military facility or in close proximity of U.S. 
Forces shall receive incidentally the benefits of measures 
undertaken to protect U.S. Forces.”157 
The Draft DOD Instruction entitled Management of 
Contractor Personnel During Contingency Operations provides 
that contractors shall “receive incidentally the benefits of 
measures undertaken to protect U.S. forces . . . .”158 However, the 
draft also mandates a higher level of responsibility in certain 
instances: “[C]ommanders shall provide force protection, 
commensurate with the level of force protection provided to 
military forces, when contractor personnel are integral to the 
military forces and providing essential contractor services (e.g., 
153. Id. at 4. 
154. See JP 4-0, supra note 73, at V-7. 
155. Id. 
156. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 2000.12, DOD ANTITERRORISM (AT) 
PROGRAM para. 4.6 (2003). 
157. Id. 
158. See DOD INST. NO. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 6.3.4. 
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contractor logistics convoys).”159 
While the Combatant Commander will make the final 
decision “to provide force protection to participating 
contractors,”160 the degree of force protection civilian contractors 
receive can also be a contractual matter that is determined by 
the contract itself.161 Consequently, astute negotiations on the 
part of civilian contractors seeking to provide services to DOD 
operations in hostile environments could obligate military 
personnel to provide increased levels of force protection. Yet, 
even if a particular contract absolves the military of formal force 
protection responsibilities, military policy maintains that 
commanders assume some duty to protect civilians 
accompanying the force,162 particularly those who are deemed to 
be M-E personnel. The June 2005 DFARS simply acknowledges 
that the military should at least provide training to those 
contractors that are issued special equipment. “The deployment 
center, or the Combatant Commander, shall issue OCIE 
[organizational clothing and individual equipment] and shall 
provide training, if necessary, to ensure the safety and security 
of contractor personnel.”163 
Obviously, commanders should “ensure that contractor 
security provisions are incorporated” into the operational plans 
(OPLANs) and operational orders (OPORDs) when determining 
the size of theater security forces.164 Given the importance of 
certain categories of contract personnel to certain missions, it is 
likely that the commander will willingly assume the 
responsibility of providing appropriate force protection 
commensurate with risks and resources available. 
Paradoxically, although the military requires force 
protection for civilian contract personnel accompanying the 
forces, it is an impossible task to perform. In turn, a lack of 
precise (and often contradictory) guidance can certainly hamper 
the ability of contractor companies to fulfill their obligations vis-
159. DOD DRAFT INST. NO. 4XXX.bb, supra note 128, para. 6.3.5. 
160. FM 100-21, supra note 43, para. 6-7. 
161. See id., paras. 6-7, 6-9; DOD INST. NO. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 6.1.4. 
162. See FM 100-21, supra note 43, para. 1-39. 
163. DFARS, supra note 51, § 252.225-740(i)(3). 
164. JP 4-0, supra note 73. 
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à-vis providing viable AT training to their employees. In short, 
to protect their employees from harm (and themselves from time 
consuming and costly lawsuits), contracting companies must 
assume high levels of force protection and AT training that may 
not be provided by the military.165 
Equally disadvantaged by the absence of a uniform 
standard, military commanders must “work with requirements 
that vary according to the services and the individual 
contracts”166 between the military and the contractor. Indeed, 
the confusing nature of the contractor force protection doctrine 
has led “the combatant commanders . . . [to request] DOD-wide 
guidance on the use of contractors to support deployed forces to 
establish a baseline [force protection policy] that applies to all 
the services.”167 Until uniform DOD guidance is fully developed 
regarding force protection, the only alternative is to ensure that 
proper and adequate AT training is provided by the parent 
contracting company to help close the gap. 
IV. AT TRAINING 
Although AT training is clearly a central theme of force 
protection in general, it is an area that requires special attention, 
particularly since the parent contracting company has a much 
larger role to play in AT training.168 
MG (Ret.) Alfred A. Valenzuela 
 
The current reality of the War on Terror has merged 
traditional force protection concerns with antiterrorism policies 
and security initiatives. It is now DOD policy that “[DOD] 
Components and the [DOD] Elements and Personnel shall be 
165. See, e.g., Jeremy Kahn & Nelson D. Schwartz, With Violence Escalating in 
Iraq, Tens of Thousands of U.S. Contractors are Getting More Than They Bargained For, 
FORTUNE, May 3, 2004, at 33 (stating that “[g]iven the danger, little work is getting done 
in Iraq . . . [c]onvoys are stalled, waiting for protection, and [contract] workers are trying 
to keep a low profile”). 
166. GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 25. 
167. Id. at 25–26. 
168. Interview with Alfred A. Valenzuela, Major Gen. (Ret.), U.S. Army, formerly 
Commander U.S. Army S.; Deputy Commanding Gen., U.S. S. Command (June 20, 2005) 
(on file with Author). 
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protected from terrorist acts through a high priority, 
comprehensive AT program.”169 Again, military commanders 
have the primary “responsibility and authority to enforce 
appropriate security measures to ensure the protection of [DOD] 
Elements and Personnel subject to their control and shall ensure 
AT awareness and readiness of all [DOD] Elements and 
Personnel . . . assigned or attached.”170 Unfortunately, this 
Directive does not define what constitutes “appropriate security 
measures.”171 Instead, the matter is left to the discretion of the 
commander on the ground,172 who is in the best position to 
understand the most salient threats and the proper 
methodologies to counter them.173 
DOD policy174 provides that training—both in certain basic 
legal issues and in techniques to manage personal security in 
hostile environments—should always be a prerequisite to 
deployment.175 Preventing the need for the military to engage in 
personnel recovery of captured civilians, military doctrine is 
clear on the need to provide appropriate AT training: 
Before entering a theater of operations or an area of 
responsibility . . . identified [DOD] civilian employees, 
[DOD] contractors (under the terms of the contract), 
and other designated personnel shall receive or already 
have completed the training necessary to survive 
isolation in a hostile environment, including captivity, 
and to return home safely and with honor.176 
Consistent with military doctrine, it seems entirely logical 
that all civilian contractors should be processed and trained 
through a DOD training site. Unfortunately, while a Draft DOD 
169. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 2000.12, supra note 156, para. 4.1. 
170. Id. para. 4.2. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. Terrorist threats, though broadly classifiable, vary widely according to time, 
place, and circumstance. The real-time intelligence and threat reporting known to a 
commander must dictate the amount and scope of AT force protection afforded to all 
personnel under the commander’s authority. Attempting to institutionalize “appropriate 
security measures” simply cannot be distilled in a DOD-wide directive. 
174. See DOD INST. NO. 3020.41, supra note 17, para. 6.2.7.9. 
175. See DOD INST. NO. 1300.23, supra note 35, paras. 4.2, 4.3. 
176. Id. para. 4.2. 
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Instruction understands this basic need,177 it is not currently the 
case. In reality, AT training is approached in an extremely 
fragmented and ad hoc manner. Although the military may 
provide AT training at Individual Deployment Sites (IDS)178 or 
Continental United States (CONUS) Replacement Centers 
(CRC)179 this does not always happen.180 In fact, the use of IDS or 
CRC facilities by contract personnel is determined based upon 
the terms of the contract between the contractor and DOD.181 
Then again, if contract personnel do require IDS or CRC pre-
deployment processing they may not get meaningful AT training 
since the IDS/CRC is tasked with actions to “screen contractor 
personnel records, conduct theater specific briefings182 and 
training, issue theater specific clothing and individual 
equipment, verify that medical requirements . . . for deployment 
have been met, and arrange for transportation to the theater of 
operations.”183 Moreover, CRC focus is on military unit training 
177. See DOD INST. NO. 3020.41, supra note,17, para. 6.2.7. 
The [DOD] Components shall ensure these requirements are delineated in 
contracts. At a minimum, contracts shall state the means by which the 
Government will inform contractors of the requirements and procedures 
applicable to a deployment. The [DOD] Components shall ensure use of one 
of the formally designated group or individual joint or Military Department 
deployment centers (e.g., Continental U.S. Replacement Center, Individual 
Replacement Center, Federal Deployment Center, Unit Deployment Site) to 
conduct deployment and redeployment processing for CDF . . . . The 
following general procedures, waiver, administrative preparation, medical, 
training, and equipping considerations are applicable during deployment 
processing of CDF and for theater admission of contingency contractor 
personnel, where indicated . . . . 
Id. 
178. See Turner & Norton, supra note 36, at 58. 
179. See generally FM 100-21, supra note 43, ch. 3. 
180. See DEP’T OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET 715-16, CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE 
CERTIFICATION PROGRAM para. 3-1(b) (2000). 
181. Id. para. 3-1(b). 
182. Briefings might include classified threat and vulnerability information 
relevant to the deployed location. In comparison to those contract personnel who do not 
receive such briefings, contract personnel who receive CRC support will be better 
positioned to understand the risks of, and the security precautions necessary for the 
specific theater. 
183. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET 715–16, supra note 180, para. 3-1(c). 
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versus training of individual survival skill sets.184 
The fact “that [DOD] contracts have varying and sometimes 
inconsistent language addressing deployment requirements” 
creates a sloppy training model for contractors engaged in 
contingency operations.185 Sending contractors into harm’s way 
absent a basic understanding of the threat or of the basic 
principles associated with terrorism law186 places the contractors 
and the military forces they support at great risk.187 Thus, while 
military doctrine provides that “[c]ontractors arriving in 
theater . . . must receive appropriate processing,”188 specified AT 
training is not a mandatory component of contractor pre-
deployment.189 Certainly, the rise of terrorism and the 
challenges of providing support to the armed forces in urban 
settings necessitate additional AT training for contractors in 
these high-risk environments.190 Yet, commanders are only 
required to offer “AT training to contractors under the terms 
specified in the contract,”191 leaving many contract personnel ill-
prepared and under-equipped to operate in locations plagued by 
the threat of car bombs, suicide bombers, and ambushes. 
184. See generally DEP’T OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET 600-81, INFORMATION 
HANDBOOK FOR OPERATING CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES (CONUS) REPLACEMENT 
CENTERS AND INDIVIDUAL DEPLOYMENT SITES (2001), available at http://www.army.mil/ 
usapa/epubs/pdf/p600_81.pdf (providing continental U.S. replacement centers and 
individual deployment sites with a standardized checklist for planning, operating, and 
executing CRC operations). 
185. See GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 35–36. 
186. Terrorism law is a phrase coined by the Author to apply to all the legal 
aspects of terrorism. See ADDICOTT, supra note 2, at xviii. Bill Piatt, Dean at St. Mary’s 
University School of Law, terms terrorism law as an “emerging legal discipline critical to 
understanding the complex balance between global security and civil justice.” Id. at xiii 
(internal quotations omitted). 
187. GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 35–36. For instance, in closing, the GAO 
recommends that the Secretary of Defense “[d]evelop and require the use of standardized 
deployment language . . . . This language should address the need to deploy into and 
around the theater, required training, entitlements, force protection, and other 
deployment related issues.” Id. at 37 (emphasis added). 
188. JP 4-0, supra note 73, at V-4. 
189. See 48 C.F.R. § 5124.74-9000 (2005). 
190. Working and living in an environment threatened by terrorism requires 
specialized training in personnel, physical, and operational security that is distinct from 
and in addition to traditional pre-deployment training. 
191. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 2000.12, supra note 156, para. 4.6. 
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The 2003 DOD guidance on isolated personnel training for 
civilian contractors does outline certain AT training 
requirements for contractors accompanying the force, but the 
level of training is not uniform—it varies based on the level of 
threat determined by the Combatant Commander.192 The 
guidance designates three levels of training regarding specific 
principals of resistance: Level A, if the perceived threat by 
hostile forces is low; Level B, for a medium threat level; and 
Level C, for a high threat level.193 The mechanics of the training 
is often accomplished through the use of videos194 and is 
designed to help the contractor survive capture and exploitation 
by hostile forces.195 The training is not representative of 
comprehensive Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape (SERE) 
training given to certain categories of military personnel. 
Another glaring deficiency associated with AT training is 
the lack of a Civilian Code of Conduct196 for civilian contractors 
who may be captured by hostile forces, including terrorists.197 
Civilian contractors sorely need “guidelines to increase their 
chance of survival in captivity, and to avoid potential criminal 
sanctions upon repatriation.”198 For example, all Americans owe 
an unconditional allegiance to the United States and that 
allegiance is not cut off simply because of capture by hostile 
forces.199 
192. See DOD INST. NO. 1300.23, supra note 35, para. 2.2. 
193. Id. para. 6.2.1. 
194. Before deploying on invitational travel orders to Colombia in 2004, the Author 
was required to view a series of videos provided by U.S. Southern Command (the 
Combatant Command). The videos covered the risks of terrorism and crime and how to 
avoid capture or exploitation. 
195. Id. 
196. For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Charlotte M. Liegl-Paul, Civilian 
Prisoners of War: A Proposed Citizen Code of Conduct, 182 MIL. L. REV. 106 (2004). 
197. See DOD INST. NO. 1300.23, supra note 35, para. 5.6 (directing the 
Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command to “develop Code of Conduct training 
standards” that are similar to the military Code of Conduct for the armed forces). 
198. Liegl-Paul, supra note 196, at 123–24. 
199. See, e.g., United States v. Tomoya Kawakita, 96 F. Supp. 824, 826 (S.D. Cal. 
1950); see also 18 U.S.C. § 794 (2000) (forbidding U.S. citizens from intentionally 
obtaining or delivering national security information to be used to harm the United 
States.). 
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DOD guidance regarding the provision of basic AT training 
has not kept up with the volume of contractors pouring into Iraq 
and other places around the globe. In effect, civilian contractor 
companies operating under the U.S. Army’s Logistics Civil 
Augmentation Program (LOGCAP),200 are left to provide their 
own AT training. Unfortunately, in far too many cases the AT 
training is sorely inadequate or is simply not done.201 The case of 
Thomas Hamill of Macon, Mississippi, is typical of how this 
process plays out in the real world.202 In late 2003, Hamill was 
hired by Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR) to serve as a driver of 
large tanker trucks in Iraq.203 Hamill’s case is noteworthy 
because he is one of the few civilian contractors to have ever 
survived a terrorist kidnapping—he escaped from his terrorist 
captors following a brutal ambush of his truck convoy.204 His 
escape in 2004 is all the more amazing because he received only 
limited training from KBR in basic force protection related 
solely to his driving duties. He had no training whatsoever from 
the military in how to survive, evade, resist, or escape from the 
terrorists.205 Escaping after twenty-four days in captivity, 
military SERE experts who interviewed him after the ordeal 
were impressed by Hamill’s level-headed dealings with his 
terrorist captors, stating: “We don’t know how you did it. You 
aren’t a soldier, and you haven’t been trained [in AT 
techniques].”206 
200. ARMY REGULATION 700-37, LOGISTICS CIVIL AUGMENTATION PROGRAM 
(LOGCAP) (1985). 
201. See James Dao, Private Guards Take Big Risks, For Right Price, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 2, 2004, at A9 (noting that “little regulation of the quality of training or recruitment 
[of contractors] by private companies” exists, possibly resulting in “inexperienced, poorly 
prepared and weakly led units playing vital roles in combat situations”). “Even elite 
former commandos [employed by security contracting firms] may not be well trained for 
every danger . . . .” Id. 
202. See THOMAS HAMILL STORY, supra note 15, at 16. KBR is the engineering and 
construction group at Halliburton. See Halliburton, Welcome to KBR, 
http://www.halliburton.com/kbr/index.jsp (last visited Feb. 5, 2006) (stating that KBR is 
“a global engineering, construction, technology and services company”). 
203. THOMAS HAMILL STORY, supra note 15, at 16. 
204. See generally THOMAS HAMILL STORY, supra note 15, at 37–38, 244–45. 
205. Id. at 258–59. 
206. Id. at 259 (internal quotations omitted). 
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Hamill was only slightly better prepared from the KBR 
training than if he had received no AT training at all. When first 
hired in 2003, Hamill was flown to KBR headquarters in 
Houston, Texas, for “a seven-day orientation class.”207 A month 
after the course, Hamill was flown to Kuwait where he was 
given a second round of training courses.208 “They had us attend 
[a] defensive-driving course[] where we discussed things such as 
convoy formations, how to spot explosive devices, booby traps, 
and how to recognize and avoid suspicious automobiles.”209 Then, 
before each convoy was started on the road for its destination, 
Hamill, now a convoy commander, would receive a safety 
briefing from KBR as to road conditions and possible danger 
from terrorist attacks.210 Beyond this, Hamill never received any 
other type of AT training. 
In light of the Hamill experience, it is imperative that either 
the military or the parent contracting company provide a higher 
level of meaningful and realistic AT training that prepares DOD 
contract personnel for high-risk deployments.211 For the 
contractor, adequate AT training provides “the first opportunity 
to get the contractor’s head in the current joint operational and 
tactical situation”212 present within the theater. Obviously, the 
preferred point of contact for this obligation should be the 
military. As it becomes the “primer for theater specific force 
protection and personnel recovery readiness of contractors en 
route from [the continental United States] to high-threat 
overseas venues,”213 the CRC has the potential to provide near 
real-time information that will improve contractor safety and 
survivability. Training also facilitates contractor compliance 
207. Id. at 16. 
208. Id. at 17. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. at 18–19. Hamilton wrote, “KBR started our mission with a meeting to 
issue safety and task instructions. The convoy commander discussed hazard 
identification and talked about dangers we might encounter.” Id. at 18. 
211. See IDA Report, supra note 23, at F-6 (describing that the U.S. Army CONUS 
CRC at Fort Benning, Georgia “could serve as a joint and interagency CRC to potentially 
enhance the accountability, survivability, and recoverability of a major segment of 
overseas personnel, including USG contractors”). 
212. Id. at F-10. 
213. Id. at F-11. 
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with and understanding of security-related DOD regulations, 
such as those regarding temporary duty travel abroad,214 made 
applicable to contract personnel through the DOD AT Program 
Directive.215 
If the military does not provide the proper AT training, 
parent contracting companies need to hire specialists to provide 
in-house training to ensure that their employees are as ready as 
possible to handle the exigencies associated with contingency 
operations and possible capture by hostiles. Not only is there a 
moral duty to see that this is accomplished, but the parent 
company that fails in this regard may be subjecting itself to 
possible civil liability. Just as contracting companies must 
ensure that employees have proper equipment, clothing, and 
supplies to perform the contract, they are also responsible to 
provide AT awareness training to their employees similar to 
that provided to military personnel. 
In short, contractors who receive AT and security-related 
training prior to deployment are better positioned to avoid and 
manage the risks encountered on MOOTW or armed conflict.216 
This, in turn, takes pressure off the commander in terms of force 
protection concerns and the conservation of military resources. 
214. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 4500.54, OFFICIAL TEMPORARY DUTY 
TRAVEL ABROAD para. 3 (1991). 
It is [DOD] policy that the number of visits and visitors to overseas areas shall be 
minimal, and be made only when their purpose cannot be satisfied by other means. 
Visits shall be arranged with a minimum requirement on equipment, facilities, time and 
services of installations, and personnel being visited. When practicable, trips to the same 
general area and in the same general period shall be consolidated. 
Id. 
215. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 2000.12, supra note 156, para. 4.5 
(requiring that “[a]ll [DOD] military, [DOD] civilians, [DOD] dependent family members, 
and [DOD] contractors shall comply with theater, country, and special clearance 
requirements”). 
216. See DEP’T OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET 27-50-323, MAJ. THOMAS W. MURREY, JR., 
KHOBAR TOWERS’ PROGENY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF FORCE PROTECTION (1999). 
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V. PARENT CONTRACTOR COMPANY LIABILITY ISSUES 
REGARDING EMPLOYEES ON THE BATTLEFIELD. 
The [civilian contractor] industry falls through the cracks at the 
national and international level . . . . Private military contractors 
exist in the same legal vacuum as detainees at Guantanamo Bay. 
Peter Singer, Brookings Institution217 
 
With the increasing number of terrorist-related deaths and 
woundings of civilian contractors accompanying the military in 
the War on Terror, the question of civil liability for contracting 
companies has become an important concern. Considering the 
rapid rate at which individual employee contractors are 
prepared, processed, and trained to go into dangerous 
environments—such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Colombia—it is 
inevitable that civil litigation against parent contract companies 
will arise. A 2004 civil lawsuit filed in Wake County Superior 
Court, Raleigh, North Carolina, against the contracting 
company Blackwater Security Consulting and other named 
defendants, illustrates the concern.218 
Nordan v. Blackwater Security Consulting219 was filed by the 
survivors of four deceased independent civilian contractors and 
is the first in the nation to be lodged against a private military 
contracting company for death during a MOOTW mission.220 The 
four contractors were hired as security consulting contractors 
and were viciously murdered on March 31, 2004, while escorting 
a civilian convoy through Fallujah, Iraq, a known hostile 
environment at the time.221 Among a list of allegations of 
217. Neff & Price, supra note 48. 
218. See id. (discussing the suit brought by the families of four contractors who 
were ambushed and killed in Fallujah in March 2004); Complaint at 1, Nordan v. 
Blackwater Security Consulting (N.C. Super. Ct. 2005) [hereinafter Nordan Complaint]. 
“The lawsuit, filed in Wake County Superior Court, is the first in the nation to be filed 
against a private military contractor for death on the battlefield, according to military, 
legal and industry experts.” Neff & Price, supra note 48. 
219. Nordan Complaint, supra note 218, at 1, 32. 
220. See Neff & Price, supra note 48. 
221. See id.; Nordan Complaint, supra note 218, at 4; see also Bergner, supra note 
16, at 33 (detailing the brutal murders of the security contractors who, in the process of 
accompanying a kitchen-supply truck to a nearby base, were attacked by insurgents). “At 
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wrongdoing, the families contend that Blackwater sent the 
contractors into this hostile environment without proper 
equipment or armed escorts as promised in the contract.222 The 
families also alleged that the amount of AT training given to the 
deceased contractors was insufficient.223 The formal allegations 
lodged by the survivors consist of fraud in the inducement of the 
contract and wrongful death as the contractors had been 
promised protection and proper information (associated with AT 
training) when they signed the contracts.224 
A new development in the Nordan case appeared in the 
summer of 2005, when a federal judge sent the suit back to state 
court. Not long after the case was first filed in January 2005, 
Blackwater filed a motion to have the case heard in federal 
court.225 Blackwater’s rationale for having the case heard in 
federal court was twofold: First, it argued that the Defense Base 
Act,226 a federal law capping death benefits for contractors 
working outside of the United States, entirely preempted state 
law relevant to this matter.227 Second, Blackwater asserted that 
the question of remedies available to contractors in war zones 
was an issue of “unique federal interest.”228 U.S. District Judge 
Louise W. Flanagan, while conceding that the case dealt with 
“novel and complex” issues, rejected Blackwater’s arguments 
and ruled that the case was appropriate for the North Carolina 
court.229 This decision was widely interpreted as a victory for the 
the time, the Fallujah killings seemed notable not only for their brutality but also for the 
fact that private security men had been the victims.” Bergner, supra note 16, at 33–34. 
222. See Nordan Complaint, supra note 218, at 5–6, 25–26. 
223. See id. at 9, 12, 14, 17, 21. 
224. See id. at 21–30. 
225. Emery P. Dalesio, Blackwater Suit Sent to State: Wrongful Death Case to Be 
Heard in N.C. Court, Federal Judge Says, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Aug. 16, 2005. 
226. See infra note 250. 
227. See Dalesio, supra note 225; see also Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1651 
(2004). 
228. See Dalesio, supra note 225. 
229. Id. The court ordered that Blackwater’s contention “that this case is 
removable by virtue of complete preemption under the DBA is without merit.” Press 
Release, Callahan & Blaine Attorneys at Law, Federal Court Rules in Favor of the 
Families of American Security Contractors Executed in Iraq (Aug. 15, 2005), available at 
http://www.callahan-law.com (follow “news & articles” hyperlink: then follow: “Federal 
Court Rules in Favor of the American Security Contractors Executed in Iraq” hyperlink) 
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plaintiffs, due to the fact that North Carolina permits pecuniary 
compensation in wrongful death suits.230 The decision could also 
be taken as a victory for legal observers interested in clearing up 
some of the muddier legal questions surrounding the rights and 
obligations of overseas civilian contractors and their employers. 
Before detailing the Nordan lawsuit, it is important to 
consider some of the possible reasons that many civilian 
contractors might be motivated to sign on to work for companies 
overseas, particularly in dangerous environments. Apart from 
fulfilling a sense of patriotism to the nation at war, in all 
probability a significant incentive rests in the increased pay that 
the civilian contractor can receive.231 Not only do most 
companies pay danger premiums for work in hostile 
environments, but much of the pay earned overseas may be tax 
deductible.232 For example, the U.S. Army allows contracting 
officers to negotiate increased amounts of pay when the 
employee operates in areas considered to be equivalent to a war-
type environment.233 For many civilians the increase in pay is a 
(internal quotations omitted) [hereinafter Callahan & Blaine]. 
230. Dalesio, supra note 225; see also Callahan & Blaine, supra note 229 (quoting 
Daniel J. Callahan, chief counsel to the plaintiffs, who claimed that the federal “court 
clearly found that the jurisdiction of this case rests with the state court, which paves the 
way for the court to hold Blackwater liable for its wrongful conduct, establish guidelines 
and accountability for the treatment of security contractors in Iraq, and send a message 
to other security contracting firms operating abroad.”). 
231. Hamill was paid “$16 to $18 per hour for a yearlong contract that would be 
worth about $75,000, all of which would be tax-free as long as [he] remained in Iraq for 
the full term of [the] contract.” THOMAS HAMILL STORY, supra note 15, at 16; see also 
Bergner, supra note 16, at 34 (reporting that Americans, on average, make between $400 
and $700 a day in Iraq, and sometimes more, depending on the amount of time they 
spend back in the United States, and most of this income is tax-free); Neff & Price, supra 
note 48 (noting that each of the contractors killed in Fallujah were induced by the offer 
of $600 per day for their labor and expertise); Bill Hendrick, World’s Most Dangerous 
Job; Iraq Duty Pays Well, and Halliburton Recruiters Find Many Ready to Roll the Dice, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 17, 2004, at 1A (describing Kellogg, Brown, & Root’s generous 
pay and benefits that “prove[s] a siren call to many applicants, some of whom have been 
unemployed for years”). 
232. Hendrick, supra note 231, at 1A (noting that many workers are willing to 
brave the extreme elements and dangers of Iraq in order to earn up to $300,000 yearly). 
“The first $80,000 is tax-free after 330 days ‘in country.’” Id. 
233. See U.S. Army Forces Central Command, Guidance for Deployed Department 
of Army Emergency-Essential (E-E) Circular Employees and Supervisors (2005), 
http://www.arcent.army.mil/civempguide/index.asp#section III; Sandra Maday, A City 
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sufficient inducement to subject themselves to a hostile, even 
deadly work environment. 
On the other hand, many companies seek to insulate 
themselves from any liability whatsoever by crafting language 
in the contract that leaves the contractor (or his heirs) with 
virtually no ability to sue the parent company. Again, the 
Nordan case is quite telling concerning the methodology of how 
the contractor company attempts to absolve itself of liability. A 
typical Blackwater contract related to employment duties in 
Iraq or Afghanistan contains a clause regarding contract 
performance during hostilities: 
Contractor agrees and acknowledges that the Services 
performed in the Duty Station . . . have been identified 
as being essential to BSC’s [Blackwater] complete 
performance under the terms of the contract between 
BSC and the Customer [the United States] and 
notwithstanding the existence of hostilities or a state of 
war, whether declared or undeclared, Contractor agrees 
to perform his or her assigned duties until released 
from such duties by the Contractor’s supervisor or the 
supervisor’s designated representative.234 
Next, the sample Blackwater contract has a clause 
headlined as “Contractor Acknowledgement, Release and 
Waiver.”235 Spelling out an assumption of the risk, the clause 
graphically reads: 
Contractor agrees and acknowledges that due to the 
hazardous nature of the Duty Station and the Services 
to be provided hereunder, Contractor hereby expressly 
and voluntarily agrees to assume any and all risks of 
personal injury including, without limitation, death and 
disability which may result from contractor providing 
Services pursuant to this Agreement. Contractor 
understands and acknowledges that the Duty Station 
[place where the contractor works] is volatile, hostile 
and extremely dangerous and in some instances, 
that Lives for Revenge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2004, at A25. 
234. Blackwater Security Consulting IC Contract, para. 10 [hereinafter Blackwater 
Contract] (on file with Author), available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/docs/private 
warriors/PW_20041023_blackwater2.pdf. (last visted Feb. 5, 2006). 
235. Id. para. 11. 
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military forces may be conducting continuing military 
operations in the region.236 
The assumption of the risk clause then continues with a 
lengthy list of the dangers and risks that the Contractor 
acknowledges and “voluntarily, expressly and irrevocably 
assum[es].”237 
Contractor understands and acknowledges that by 
voluntarily agreeing to participate in the Engagement 
[accompanying the military on a contingency operation 
or actual armed conflict], he is voluntarily, expressly 
and irrevocably assuming any and all known and 
unknown, anticipated and unanticipated risks which 
could result in physical or emotional injury, paralysis, 
death, or damage to himself, to his property, or to third 
parties, whether or not such injury or death is caused 
by other independent contractors to BSC, known and 
unknown domestic and foreign citizens or terrorist or 
U.S. governmental employees.238 
In addition to the above exculpatory clauses, Blackwater 
further attempts to release liability for any acts of negligence on 
its part by including the following language in a clause entitled 
“Release:”239 
Contractor, on behalf of Contractor and Contractor’s 
spouse, heirs, administrators, estate, personal 
representatives, successors and assigns (collectively 
referred to as “Contractor’s Group”), hereby releases 
and forever discharges BSC . . . (collectively referred to 
236. Id. 
237. Id. 
238. Id. The clause then continues with a list of the risks: 
The risks include, among other things and without limitation, the 
undersigned being shot, permanently maimed and/or killed by a firearm or 
munitions, falling aircraft or helicopters, sniper fire, landmine, artillery fire, 
rocket propelled grenade, truck or car bomb, earthquake or other natural 
disaster, poisoning, civil uprising, terrorist activity, hand to hand combat, 
disease, poisoning, [poisoning is listed twice], etc., killed or maimed while a 
passenger in a helicopter or fixed wing aircraft, suffering hearing loss, eye 
injury or loss; inhalation or contact with biological or chemical contaminants 
(whether airborne or not) and or flying debris, etc. 
Id. 
239. Id. para. 11.2. 
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as “Releasees”) from any and all claims, judgments, 
awards, actions and causes of action which may be 
asserted now or in the future by Contractor’s Group for 
any liability whatsoever for accident, injury (including 
without limitation, death or disability), losses, loss of 
consortium, expenses, loss of income and other damages 
based upon or in any way arising from Contractor’s 
performance of Services pursuant to this Agreement 
and the transportation of Contractor, including, without 
limitation, loss of life . . . whether as a result of 
negligence, gross negligence, omissions or failure to 
guard or warn against dangerous conditions, use, 
structure or activity, or any other cause, arising from 
Contractor’s participation in the Engagement . . . even 
if such injury was caused in whole or in part by the 
negligence of Releases.240 
To further reinforce the position that the company cannot be 
sued in civil court, the contract specifically spells out the 
following in a separate paragraph entitled “Covenant Not to 
Sue:”241 
Contractor further agrees and covenants not to file, 
prosecute, bring, maintain or in any way proceed on any 
claim, suit, civil action, complaint, arbitration or 
administrative action or proceeding of any kind in any 
municipal, state, federal agency, court, or tribunal 
against Releasees with respect [sic] any of the foregoing 
facts, occurrences, events, transactions, damages, 
injuries, claims, causes of action and other matters 
released in Section 11.2 [the “Release” clause set out 
above].242 
Then, in a separate clause entitled, “Liquidated Damages,”243 
the Blackwater contract expressly sets out: 
The parties hereto expressly agree that in the event of 
Contractor’s death or injury based upon or in any way 
arising from Contractor’s performance of Services 
pursuant to this Agreement and the transportation of 
240. Id. (emphasis added). 
241. Id. para. 11.3. 
242. Id. 
243. Id. para. 11.4. 
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Contractor, even if such injury was caused in whole or 
in part by the negligence of Releasees, Contractor’s 
Group has no recourse whatsoever against BSC. 
Contractor understands and agrees that if he is hurt or 
killed during Contractor’s performance of Services 
pursuant to this Agreement or the transportation of 
Contractor, Contractor has no recourse whatsoever 
against Releasees.244 
Finally, at the end of the lengthy contract, the contractor 
employee agrees to a final waiver: 
By signing this document, Contractor acknowledges 
that if Contractor is hurt or his property is damaged 
while providing Services hereunder, the intent is that 
Contractor and Contractor’s Group is bound by this 
Release and Indemnification and therefore will be found 
by a court of law to have waived his right to maintain a 
lawsuit against BSC on the basis of any claim from 
which Contractor has released them herein.245 
Obviously, an employment contract such as the detailed 
Blackwater example serves as a formidable shield to any legal 
responsibility on the part of the parent company. Because many 
contracts are interpreted within the “four corners” of the 
contract, these iron clad provisions are generally viewed as 
binding, leaving contract personnel with little recourse against 
the company if he or she is harmed or killed.246 Likewise, there 
appears to be little incentive for the company to take 
responsibility for its contractors as the contract language 
precludes the contractor from suing,247 even for the company’s 
negligent behavior.248 
244. Id. 
245. Id. para. 20.16. 
246. See 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 32:5 (4th ed. 2005). 
247. Blackwater Contract, supra note 234, para. 20. The Blackwater contract does 
contain a paragraph that the agreement “shall be governed by . . . the law[] of the State 
of North Carolina, applicable to contracts made and to be fully performed therein, 
excluding its conflict of laws principles.” Id. 
248. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS 170 (5th ed. 1984) (describing negligence as “conduct which falls below a standard 
established by the law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm. 
The idea of risk in this context necessarily involves a recognizable danger, based upon 
some knowledge of the existing facts, and some reasonable belief that harm may possibly 
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In response to the plaintiffs in Nordan, Blackwater can raise 
the following defenses: the contract specifically spelled out the 
dangers; the workers signed a release giving up most of their 
rights to sue Blackwater if something untoward happened to 
them; their families and their estates cannot sue either, even if 
the deaths were the result of Blackwater’s negligence or gross 
negligence; and the contractors signed on willingly, were being 
paid a large sum of money, and were fully aware of all of the 
risks since all of them were military veterans.249 Furthermore, 
Blackwater will argue that the Defense Base Act250 is the 
contractor’s remedy, particularly if the dependents of the 
contractors have already started to receive payments for the 
deaths of the contractors. However, if the court finds that the 
decedents were not employees, but rather independent 
contractors, then the applicability of the statute is brought into 
question. The test to determine whether the decedents were 
independent contractors will center on a number of factors to 
include: (1) the extent of control exercised over the work by the 
employer; (2) the presence of independent skills, knowledge, and 
training of the decedents; (3) the method of payment and taxes; 
(4) the length of time of employment; and (5) the provision of 
equipment.251 Indeed, if the court finds that the relationship 
between the decedents and Blackwater was not that of 
employee/employer, then the Act will not bar recovery by the 
plaintiffs.252 
follow.”). 
249. See Neff & Price, supra note 48 (noting that all of the contractors were 
military veterans and likely knew of the inherent risks of working in Iraq; and if they 
weren’t aware of those risks, the unequivocal language in the contract would get their 
attention). 
250. 42 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000). Better known as the Defense Base Act, this 
legislation extends provisions of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ 
Compensation Act to personal injuries and deaths suffered by employees of military 
bases overseas. Id. §§ 1651(a)(1)–(2), (6). In effect, the Act “established workers’ 
compensation insurance for the employees of overseas government contractors.” Neff & 
Price, supra note 48. One spokesman has already alluded to the possibility that 
Blackwater would use the Defense Base Act to bar the plaintiffs from collecting any 
damages from the company. Id. (arguing that “[t]he dependents . . . have begun receiving 
lifetime payments of $1,100 per week tax-free”). 
251. 41 AM. JUR. 2D Independent Contractors § 5 (2005). 
252. 42 U.S.C. § 1651(a). 
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Aside from the relying on the contract provisions 
themselves, the parent contracting companies can also rely on a 
“Government Contract Defense” to further absolve themselves of 
responsibility. First raised in the context of a contractor’s 
liability for a manufacturing defect, this defense is set out by the 
United States Supreme Court in Boyle v. United Technologies.253 
Boyle arose in the context of a tort claim asserting that a defense 
contractor had negligently designed a helicopter escape hatch 
resulting in the death of the pilot when the helicopter crashed.254 
The Court applied a three-prong test to determine whether the 
contractor was immune from suit. The Court concluded that the 
Government Contract Defense was applicable where: (1) the 
contractor has taken actions at the direction of agency officials 
exercising their discretionary authority; (2) the directions 
involved reasonably precise specifications created by the 
Government with which the contractor complied; and (3) the 
contractor did not fail to warn the Government of known 
dangers associated with the Government’s design. 255 The 
contractor was immunized from tort liability for damages 
arising from the alleged helicopter design defects.256 
Currently, the immunity arising under Boyle is a potentially 
valuable tool for those contract companies that provide a 
weapons system in a battlefield environment. Providing such 
equipment in a combat or contingency operation raises the 
stakes for all parties involved. This is true because the failure of 
a weapons system can have direct adverse consequences in 
terms of property damage and combat casualties.257 Such 
adverse consequences could then give rise to potentially 
enormous financial liability to the contractor.258 
253. 487 U.S. 500 (1988). 
254. See id. at 502–03. 
255. See id. at 512–14. 
256. See id. at 512. 
257. See generally id. at 511–13; see also Threats and Responses, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 18, 2003, at A14. 
258. See generally Malesko v. Correctional Servs. Corp., 229 F.3d 374, 382 (2d. Cir. 
2000); Carley v. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117, 1120–21 (3d Cir. 1993); Guillory v. Ree’s 
Countract Serv., Inc., 872 F. Supp. 344, 346 (S.D. Miss. 1994); Lamb v. Martin Marietta 
Energy Sys., Inc., 835 F. Supp. 959, 966–67 (W.D. Ky. 1993). 
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While this scenario no doubt makes reliance on the Boyle 
defense a potentially important shield for contractors, it is 
important to note that Boyle involved a contract for production 
of a weapons system.259 Currently, many overseas contractor 
efforts in support of contingency operations usually involve 
contracts for services. At least two federal district courts have 
undertaken detailed analyses of this issue, and both have held 
that the rationale for the defense outlined in Boyle and its 
progeny dictates that the defense is also available to civilian 
contractors performing service contracts, not just 
manufacturing.260 
Another possible line of defense for a contracting company is 
the so-called “Government Agency Defense.”261 This defense 
basically holds that if a contractor engages in a valid legal 
activity in furtherance of the performance of a government 
contract he is immune from suit for that activity to the extent 
that the government would be immune if sued directly.262 The 
treatment of this defense by federal courts in recent decades has 
been woefully inconsistent and, therefore, unfortunately 
provides little real guidance.263 
Despite the rigid language of Blackwater-styled contracts 
and the above-mentioned defenses, plaintiffs (like those in 
259. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 500. 
260. See Richland-Lexington Airport Dist. v. Atlas Properties, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 
400, 422–23 (D.S.C. 1994); Askir v. Brown & Root Serv. Corp., No. 95-11008, 1997 WL 
598587, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1997). 
261. See Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Const. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 20–21 (1940) (establishing 
the government agency defense); see also Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 
736, 739 (11th Cir. 1985) (explaining that under the government agency defense, the 
agent’s actions are imputed to the government, so “the contractor could be deemed to 
share in federal sovereign immunity”). 
262. See Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 20–21 (“Where an agent or officer of the Government 
purporting to act on its behalf has been held to be liable for his conduct causing injury to 
another, the ground of liability has been found to be either that he exceeded his 
authority or that it was not validly conferred.”). 
263. See Shaw, 778 F.2d at 740 (noting that the government contractor “defense is 
rarely invoked, and its elements are nowhere clearly stated”); see also Richland-
Lexington, 854 F. Supp. at 421 n.14 (explaining that the government agency defense is 
actually a distinct subset of the more general government contractor defense; while 
rarely used, the government agency defense has been mislabeled and misapplied in other 
cases). 
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Nordan) may still be able to recover significant monetary 
damages even if they entered into an “iron-clad” contract. First, 
the claims will be filed in individual State courts and therefore 
the applicable State law may provide some relief, for example, 
under a wrongful death statute that allows for financial 
compensation or an expansive strict liability theory. Apart from 
the fact that the parent company may be held liable for 
intentional or reckless conduct, strict liability may prove to be a 
viable option. 
The Second Restatement of Torts established strict liability 
for defendants who engage in ultrahazardous or abnormally 
dangerous activities.264 Clearly, sending contractors into hostile 
combat zones would be considered an abnormally dangerous 
activity. Section 519 of the Restatement generally declares that 
“[o]ne who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is 
subject to liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of 
another resulting from the activity, although he has exercised 
the utmost care to prevent the harm.”265 Naturally, this section 
also limits the liability “to the kind of harm, the possibility of 
which makes the activity abnormally dangerous.”266 
264. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519–524A (1977). 
265. Id. § 519(1). The Restatement does not explicitly define what qualifies as an 
abnormally dangerous activity, but the Reporters’ Note lists a number of specific 
instances where courts have found the defendant to be engaged in an abnormally 
dangerous activity. Id. Such activities include, but are not limited to: (1) the collection of 
water in quantity in an inappropriate or dangerous location; (2) the use of explosives in 
an unsafe area; (3) the use of inflammable liquids or blasting in the middle of an urban 
area; (4) pile driving; (5) the escape of poisonous chemicals into the air; (6) the drilling of 
oil wells or the operation of refineries in highly populated areas; and (7) nuclear energy 
production. Id. 
266. Id. § 519(2). To clarify, the comment for this subsection states that “[t]he rule 
of strict liability . . . applies only to harm that is within the scope of the abnormal risk 
that is the basis of the liability.” Id. § 519 cmt. e; see, e.g., Madsen v. East Jordan 
Irrigation Co., 125 P.2d 794, 795 (Utah 1942) (finding strict liability inapplicable where 
the defendant’s nearby blasting operation disturbed a farmer’s minks, who reacted by 
killing their offspring). In Madsen, the court found that strict liability was inappropriate, 
because the resulting harm was unforeseeable. Id. at 795–96; see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 524A (1977) (explaining that a defendant engaged in an 
abnormally dangerous activity is not liable if the harm would not have occurred but for 
the abnormally sensitive nature of the plaintiff’s activity); see generally George P. 
Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 543–56 (1972) 
(juxtaposing the defendant’s imposition of an unreasonable risk of harm on plaintiffs 
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The subjective factors for determining whether or not an 
activity is abnormally dangerous are set out in § 520 of the 
Restatement.267 These factors include: (1) the “existence of a high 
degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of 
others;”268 (2) the “likelihood that the harm that results from it 
will be great;”269 (3) the “inability to eliminate the risk by the 
exercise of reasonable care;”270 (4) the “extent to which the 
activity is not a matter of common usage;”271 (5) the 
“inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried 
on;”272 and (6) the “extent to which its value to the community is 
outweighed by its dangerous attributes.”273 
with the reciprocal plaintiff’s imposition of an unreasonable risk of liability on the 
defendant). 
267. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977). 
268. Id. § 520(a). “In determining whether there is . . . a major risk, it may 
therefore be necessary to take into account the place where the activity is 
conducted . . . .” Id. § 520 cmt. g. 
269. Id. § 520(b). “The harm threatened must be major in degree, and sufficiently 
serious in its possible consequences to justify holding the defendant strictly responsible 
for subjecting others to an unusual risk.” Id. § 520 cmt. g. 
270. Id. § 520(c). “Most ordinary activities can be made entirely safe by the taking 
of all reasonable precautions; and when safety cannot be attained by the exercise of due 
care there is reason to regard the danger as an abnormal one.” Id. §520 cmt. h. “The 
utility of [the defendant’s] conduct may be such that he is socially justified in proceeding 
with his activity, but the unavoidable risk of harm that is inherent in it requires that it 
be carried on at his peril, rather than at the expense of the innocent person who suffers 
harm as a result of it.” Id. 
271. Id. § 520(d). Comment i of this section explains: 
An activity is a matter of common usage if it is customarily carried on by the 
great mass of mankind or by many people in the community. It does not 
cease to be so because it is carried on for a purpose peculiar to the individual 
who engages in it. Certain activities, notwithstanding their recognizable 
danger, are so generally carried on as to be regarded as customary. 
Id. § 520 cmt. i. Stated generally, if the hazardous activity is rare and is not engaged in 
by the general public, it is more likely to be tagged as abnormally dangerous. Id. 
272. Id. § 520(e). “In other words, the fact that the activity is inappropriate to the 
place where it is carried on is a factor of importance in determining whether the danger 
is an abnormal one.” Id. at § 520 cmt. j. 
273. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(f) (1977). “Even though the activity 
involves a serious risk of harm that cannot be eliminated with reasonable care and it is 
not a matter of common usage, its value to the community may be such that the danger 
will not be regarded as an abnormal one.” Id. § 520 cmt. k. Generally, the activity will 
not be considered abnormally dangerous “when the community is largely devoted to the 
dangerous enterprise and its prosperity largely depends on it.” Id. 
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In assessing each of the factors listed in § 520, it should be 
noted that none of them are dispositive, and it is not necessary 
to prove each of them in order to find that an activity qualifies 
as abnormally dangerous.274 Moreover, none of the factors have 
to be given equal weight.275 In short, the framers of the 
Restatement grant courts wide latitude in using these factors to 
determine the dangerousness of the activity.276 Section 522 takes 
things a step further, imposing strict liability on a defendant 
engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity “for the resulting 
harm although it is caused by the unexpectable [1] innocent, 
negligent, or reckless conduct of a third person, or [2] action of 
an animal, or [3] operation of a force of nature.”277 
Applying all of these factors to the plaintiffs’ claims in 
Nordan, it appears on the surface that a solid case for strict 
liability can certainly be made against the defendants. It is 
difficult, if not impossible, to argue that the defendant’s 
274. See id. § 520 cmt. f. This comment further elaborates: 
In determining whether the danger is abnormal, the factors . . . are all to be 
considered, and are all of importance. Any one of them is not necessarily 
sufficient of itself in a particular case, and ordinarily several of them will be 
required for strict liability. On the other hand, it is not necessary that each 
of them be present, especially if others weigh heavily. 
Id. 
275. Id. 
276. See id. Comment f sums up the appropriate way for courts to assess these 
factors: 
Because of the interplay of these various factors, it is not possible to reduce 
abnormally dangerous activities to any definition. The essential question is 
whether the risk created is so unusual, either because of its magnitude or 
because of the circumstances surrounding it, as to justify the imposition of 
strict liability for the harm that results from it, even though it is carried on 
with all reasonable care. In other words, are its dangers and 
inappropriateness for the locality so great that, despite any usefulness it 
may have for the community, it should be required as a matter of law to pay 
for any harm it causes, without the need of a finding of negligence. 
Id. 
277. Id. § 522 (1977). The drafters explain their rationale behind this section, 
noting that “those who carry on abnormally dangerous activities . . . have for their own 
purposes created a risk that is not a usual incident of the ordinary life of the 
community.” Id. § 522 cmt. a. “If the risk ripens into injury, it is immaterial that the 
harm occurs through the unexpectable action of a human being, an animal or a force of 
nature.” Id. 
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business does not qualify as an abnormally dangerous activity. 
The representations made to the plaintiffs when they signed on 
with Blackwater to serve as security contractors certainly sent a 
message that their job would include specific hazards that 
required special equipment and training (to include AT 
training).278 It also appears that most of the six factors listed in 
§ 520 can be applied to the facts of the Nordan case. The first 
four factors are particularly applicable, as it is obvious that the 
situation the security contractors faced in Fallujah constituted 
“a high degree of risk of some harm . . . [to] others,”279 with the 
likelihood that the resulting harm “will be great”280 and could 
not be eliminated with “the exercise of reasonable care.”281 
Moreover, it will be difficult for the defendants to demonstrate 
that the activity they hired the contractors to engage in was “a 
matter of common usage.”282 
Nevertheless, the last two factors are more problematic for 
the plaintiff. It is less likely that a court will find the 
defendants’ activities in Fallujah to be inappropriate for that 
278. See Nordan Complaint, supra note 218, para. 13 (stating various protections, 
tools, and information that Blackwater claimed the security contractors would be 
supplied within performing their job in Iraq). These resources that were promised by 
Blackwater included: (1) assurances that no security mission would be staffed with less 
than six team members; (2) guarantees that all missions would be conducted in armored 
vehicles; (3) promises that each security team would be equipped with no less than two 
armored vehicles, with three or more security contractors in each vehicle; (4) assurances 
that the tail gunner on each armored vehicle would have a heavy automatic weapon 
capable of firing up to 850 rounds per minute; (5) a pledge that security contractors 
would receive at least twenty-four hours notice before any mission; (6) promises that risk 
assessment reviews would be completed before the contractors embarked on any mission 
(including a caveat that if the threat level for any mission was too high, the contractors 
would have the option of not performing); (7) allowances for the contractors to review 
travel plans, gather intelligence and perform inspections of the route and general 
logistics prior to any mission; and (8) assurances that the security contractors would be 
given three weeks to acclimate themselves to the locale and determine the lay of the land 
and possible safe routes. Id. Although many of the promises made by Blackwater went 
unfulfilled, the amount and breadth of the arrangements would suggest to a reasonable 
contractor that this job would be unusually difficult and hazardous. Id. 
279. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(a) (1977). 
280. Id. § 520(b). 
281. Id. § 520(c). 
282. Id. § 520(d). 
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locale.283 Fallujah was a well-known hostile zone where 
terrorists regularly operated.284 Additionally, the court could 
subjectively find that the valuable service that the defendants 
supplied to the Iraqi civilian population and American troops in 
the Fallujah community outweighed the dangerous attributes of 
the activity itself.285 
At the end of the day, of course, the Restatement grants the 
court the power to exercise a great amount of discretion in 
assessing these criteria. Accordingly, the formula the court 
would use to assign weight and persuasiveness to each of the 
factors makes prognostication nearly impossible. Still, § 519 of 
the Restatement reveals that a defendant can exercise the 
utmost care and still be liable for the harm that another suffers 
as a result of the defendant’s abnormally dangerous activity.286 
As such, the precautions taken and the equipment supplied by 
Blackwater cannot shield them from strict liability for the 
harms that befell the plaintiffs in Fallujah on March 31, 2004. A 
fortiori, if the plaintiff can show that Blackwater was actually 
deficient in providing the proper equipment or AT training, the 
strict liability case becomes stronger. 
On the other hand, it must be admitted that other factors 
make the imposition of strict liability on the defendants, based 
on their engagement in an abnormally dangerous activity, much 
more difficult. Most significantly, § 523 of the Restatement 
makes a “plaintiff’s assumption of the risk of harm from an 
abnormally dangerous activity” an absolute bar from recovery.287 
283. Id. § 520(e). 
284. See Sandra Mackey, A City That Lives for Revenge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2004, 
at A25 (noting Fallujah’s connection to the tribes of central Iraq and their longtime 
resistance to any outside authority, whether Baathist or American). Fallujah was 
ultimately cleared of the terrorists in late 2004 by American and Iraq forces. 
285. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(f) (1997). 
286. Id. § 519. 
287. Id. § 523. “[T]he ordinary contributory negligence of the plaintiff in failing to 
discover an abnormally dangerous activity or to take precautions against it is not a 
defense to the strict liability of the actor who carries it on, [but] the plaintiff’s voluntary 
acceptance of the abnormal risk is a defense.” Id. § 523 cmt. b. However, the plaintiff 
does not assume risk without knowledge of its existence. Id. § 523 cmt. c. “The risk 
inseparable from the great majority of abnormally dangerous activities is . . . a matter of 
such common knowledge and general notoriety that in the absence of special 
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The defendants are likely to argue the plaintiff was aware of all 
of the dangers associated with the job and still signed an 
employment contract that specifically informed them of the 
risks, which they assumed.288 If the court finds this argument to 
be credible, it could prove fatal to the plaintiffs’ claims of strict 
liability based on the exercise of an abnormally dangerous 
activity. Nevertheless, many courts view assumption of the risk 
language to be calculated risks that do not automatically bind 
contractor-employees, particularly when viewed in the light of 
any promises made by the parent contracting company.289 
Faced with the assumption of the risk obstacle, which is 
included as boilerplate contract language for all of the 
contracting companies, the plaintiffs could still use some of the 
strict liability elements to buttress their negligence claims.290 As 
counterintuitive as it might appear, in arguing for imposition of 
strict liability, plaintiffs could cite the amount of increased 
training they were required to undertake as evidence of the 
abnormal and hazardous nature of the activity. As more often is 
circumstances . . . a plaintiff may often be found to have the knowledge notwithstanding 
his own denial.” Id. 
288. Without looking at the employment contract signed by the plaintiffs, it is 
difficult to accurately speculate whether the assumption of risk defense will be 
successful. However, it will even more difficult for the plaintiffs to argue that they were 
not aware of the risk inherent with their jobs, even before they left for Iraq. After all, 
media coverage of the second Gulf War has consistently emphasized the everyday perils 
faced by coalition troops and contractors in Iraq. See Kirk Semple, Deployed: Dangerous 
Patrol; New York Nerve, Tested on Meanest Streets, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2005, at B1 
(detailing the dangers faced and fears overcome by New York City’s “Fighting 69th” 
battalion, part of the National Guard’s 42nd Infantry Division); see also Qassim 
Mohammed & Susannah A. Nesmith, Suicide Bombing Kills 116 in Iraq: The Attack, on 
Military and Police Recruits, was the Deadliest Since the Fall of Hussein in 2003, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, Mar. 1, 2005, at A1 (discussing the worst insurgent attack in Iraq in nearly 
two years and noting Sunni insurgents’ success in driving up the body count); Eric 
Schmitt, The Few and the Proud Fret About the ‘Few,’ N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2005, at A19 
(noting Marine recruiter concerns that “the ‘Falluja effect’—a steady drumbeat of 
military casualties from Iraq, punctuated by graphic televised images of urban combat—
[has] sear[ed] an image into the public eye” that has strongly impacted public opinion 
and military recruitment numbers). 
289. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416 (1965). See also Jonathan Finer, 
Security Contracts in Iraq Under Scrutiny After Shootings, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2005, 
at A1. 
290. See infra notes 302–06 and accompanying text. 
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the case, in arguing a strict liability or negligence theory of 
recovery the plaintiffs would argue that they received no 
extensive AT training and therefore were more likely to suffer 
the harms that they did, in fact, suffer. Thus, since they were 
not provided proper AT training they could not form the 
required level of understanding to appreciate the dangers they 
were waiving. In other words, the injuries the plaintiffs suffered 
were directly attributable to the lack of information and AT 
training offered by the parent contracting company. Indeed, 
inadequate and nonexistent training has been cited frequently 
by contractors in Iraq as an ongoing and potentially dangerous 
problem.291 
In addition, plaintiffs can claim, as in Nordan, that they 
relied on the defendant’s promises of proper AT training and 
force protection in making their decision to sign the subject 
contract. In Nordan, the four men could allege that the parent 
company neglected their duty to provide AT training and force 
protection, or engaged in intentional fraud (perhaps in the 
interest of greater profits) to induce the plaintiffs to enter the 
contract. Stated specifically, fraud in the inducement applies 
when the defendant knowingly makes a false representation of a 
material fact, intending that action to be acted upon.292 
Additionally, the plaintiff must have incurred damages in its 
reasonable reliance and action upon the false representation.293 
In the event that fraud in the inducement of a contract is found, 
the court orders rescission of the entire contract. In short, the 
so-called “iron clad” contract is gone. 
At the end of the day, the repercussions of any lawsuit to the 
parent contracting company can extend far beyond 
compensatory or even punitive damages. The injury to 
reputation can impact negatively on developing new business 
contacts and cause difficulty in recruiting new hires. 
291. See THOMAS HAMILL STORY, supra note 15, at 31–32. 
292. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977). 
293. Id. 
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VI. PERSONNEL RECOVERY 
Preserving the lives and well-being of . . . contractors placed in 
danger of being isolated, beleaguered, detained, captured or 
having to evade while participating in U.S.-sponsored activities 
or missions is one of the highest priorities of the Department of 
Defense.294 
DOD Instruction 1300.23 
 
As stated, contractors who have “fallen into the power of the 
enemy” during an international armed conflict are considered 
POWs and are to be afforded all the protections of the Geneva 
Conventions.295 As such, during captivity the contractor is now a 
POW and must receive adequate food, water, shelter, and 
clothing.296 Following the cessation of active hostilities between 
the two warring parties, the contractor must be released.297 
Toward this end, DOD policy requires that: 
Before entering a theater of operation or an area of 
responsibility, identified [DOD] civilian employees, 
[DOD] contractors (under the terms of the contract), 
and other designated personnel shall know their 
personal legal status under the Geneva Conventions. 
Knowledge of their personal legal status shall assist 
those who become captured or isolated to apply properly 
the rights and privileges afforded to them under 
international law.298 
Ironically, DOD issued this broad-reaching Instruction on 
August 20, 2003,299 more than three months after the cessation 
of the international armed conflict in Iraq and almost three 
294. DOD INST. NO. 1300.23, supra note 35, para. 4.1. 
295. See Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. For POW status 
to attach, contractors must “have received authorization from the armed forces which 
they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card . . . .” Id. 
296. Id. arts. 25–27. 
297. Id. art. 118. Article 118 states, “Prisoners of war shall be released and 
repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.” Id. 
298. DOD INST. NO. 1300.23, supra note 35, para. 4.3. 
299. Id. 
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years after the beginning of the international armed conflict in 
Afghanistan.300 Still, since most of the contractor casualties in 
the War on Terror have not occurred during the rather brief 
periods of international armed conflict against totalitarian 
regimes,301 international law of war protections are not 
applicable. 
The vast majority of contractor deaths, kidnappings, and 
woundings have occurred during MOOTW missions,302 
particularly in the context of the ongoing terror attacks by al-
Qa’eda, insurgents, and other criminals. In contingency 
operations, civilians accompanying the force represent easy 
targets for enemy forces set on hostage-taking.303 There is no 
question that the terrorists recognize the propaganda value of 
exploiting the media and sensationalizing the kidnappings.304 
Because contractors are typically unarmed, have little 
knowledge of, or training in evasion techniques (that is, no AT 
training), and may receive only incidental protection from 
combatant personnel, the risk of capture is often high.305 Once 
captured, many are viciously tortured and murdered.306 
300. See Steven Lee Myers & Thom Shanker, A Nation Challenged: Military; Large 
U.S. Force Is Assembling as Bush Decides How to Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001, at 
B1 (describing preparations for war in Afghanistan); Threats and Responses: Bush’s 
Speech on Iraq: ‘Saddam Hussein and His Sons Must Leave’, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2003, 
at A14 (warning of impending military action against Iraq). 
301. See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text. 
302. See State Department Issues Travel Warning on Columbia, U.S FED NEWS, 
Jan. 18, 2006 (noting the fact that Marxist rebels in Colombia kidnap American 
contractors as well as tourists). 
303. According to the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, a website which maintains a 
comprehensive list of combatant and noncombatant statistics including the numbers of 
contractors killed and missing in Iraq, at least 14 contractors currently have the status 
“missing.” Many more have been killed. See Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, available at 
http://icasualties.org/oif/Civ.aspx (last visited Feb. 5, 2006) (on file with Author) (site 
now reflects current number missing). 
304. See Rod Nordland, In Fear Ridden Baghdad, No Place is Safe, NEWSWEEK, 
Oct. 4, 2004, at 30. Not only are Americans targeted, but foreigners have been taken 
hostage in Iraq and murdered as well. Id. at 31. 
305. See generally supra Part III. 
306. See, e.g., Steven Fainaru & Karl Vick, British Hostage’s Beheading Confirmed 
by Family, Video; Insurgents in Iraq Had Killed Engineer’s Colleagues, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 10, 2004, at A12 (describing when Iraqi terrorists abducted contractors Kenneth 
Bigley, Jack Hensely, and Eugene “Jack” Armstrong in September 2004—all of whom 
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Although the terrorist attacks are not considered to be 
under the umbrella of any international set of rules, the 
distinction has little meaning to al-Qa’eda-like terror groups 
who have no regard for any civilized rules regulating armed 
conflict. Terrorists, insurgents, and criminal gangs who prey 
upon contractors do not subscribe to the law of war or civilized 
behavior, thereby making the protections afforded by any rule of 
law hollow, with little practical or perceived value.307 
Considering the prospect of torture and other violence likely to 
befall the captured civilian contractor, the issue of personnel 
recovery is a pressing matter.308 
While a primary purpose of AT training is to provide 
contractors with the skills necessary to avoid capture, it is also 
concerned with providing skills to allow them to cope with 
possible capture and return to U.S. control.309 Thus, AT training 
should always be viewed as a venue for SERE training. The very 
purpose of AT training is to avoid potential threats. 
It is DOD policy: that [p]reserving the lives and well-
being of U.S. military, [DOD] civilian and contract 
service employees placed in danger of being isolated, 
beleaguered, detained, captured or having to evade 
while participating in a U.S.-sponsored activity or 
mission is one of the highest priorities of the 
Department of Defense. The Department of Defense has 
a moral obligation to protect its personnel, prevent 
exploitation of its personnel by adversaries, and reduce 
the potential for captured personnel being used as 
leverage against the United States.310 
were later brutally murdered by their captors). 
307. See 9/11 REPORT, supra note 27, at xvi (recognizing that the radical Islamic 
terrorists make “no distinction between military and civilian targets”). 
308. See Roxana Tiron, Pentagon Seeks Joint Doctrine, Training for Personnel 
Recovery, NAT’L DEF., Nov. 2004, available at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/ 
issues/2004/Nov/JointDoctrine.htm (noting that the usual stakes inherent in personnel 
recovery have heightened in light of the increasingly common abduction of civilian 
contractors in Iraq). 
309. See id. The use of the contract to delineate the scope and amount of contractor 
training (or lack thereof) is not limited to personnel recovery. See AT Training, supra 
Part IV. 
310. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE NO. 2310.2, supra note 3, para. 4. 
ADDICOTT FINAL FORMATTED - EIC EDITS 3/6/2006 11:18 AM 
2006] CONTRACTORS ON THE “BATTLEFIELD” 381 
                                                          
Nevertheless, it is no secret that personnel recovery matters 
are fragmented and a National Security Presidential Directive is 
sorely needed.311 Although the military has attempted to recover 
captured contractors in Iraq,312 whether such a rescue attempt is 
made may not only be limited by operational constraints (for 
instance, a lack of intelligence as to the location of the 
contractor),313 but also due to a lack of clear, high-level 
guidance.314 Each military service plan for individual operations, 
the training/preparation for such operations315 and even the 
terminology is defined differently. Indeed, the term “personnel 
recovery” is defined differently within the military 
establishment.316 One source defines personnel recovery as 
follows: 
[A]ggregation of military, civil, and political efforts to 
recover captured, detained, evading, isolated or missing 
personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and 
denied areas. Personnel recovery may occur through 
military action, action by non-governmental 
organizations, other U.S. Government-approved action, 
and diplomatic initiatives, or through any combination 
of these options.317 
311. See IDA Report, supra note 23. 
312. See, e.g., Mark Sage, Iraq: The Aftermath: US Troops in Two Failed Attempts 
to Save Bigley, INDEP. (London), Oct. 13, 2004, at 5 (detailing two unsuccessful attempts 
by American soldiers to find and free civilian contractors Kenneth Bigley, Jack Hensley, 
and Eugene Armstrong before their deaths). 
313. See Tiron, supra note 308 (noting that the urban environment in Iraq makes 
it easy for terrorists to hide kidnapped personnel). 
314. See IDA Report, supra note 23, at 8. 
315. There exists no dedicated military force for personnel recovery; in fact, 
ongoing combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have spread current recovery forces 
perilously thin. See Tiron, supra note 308 (noting that the War on Terror places an 
emphasis in “primary combat tasks”). 
316. See IDA Report, supra note 23, at 4 (proposing the definition of personnel 
recovery: “the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the 
recovery of U.S. military, Government civilians, and Government contractors who 
become isolated from friendly control while participating in U.S. sponsored activities 
abroad, and of other persons designated by the President”). Note that this definition is 
broad, as the term “U.S. sponsored activities” is not limited to the battlefield. See supra 
note 3 (defining personnel recovery). 
317. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE NO. 2310.2, supra note 3, para. 3 (Note 
that the word “contractor” is rarely included in this pre-War on Terror instruction). 
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In effect, the term “personnel recovery” is an umbrella term 
that envisions a combination of military, civil, and political 
efforts united to obtain the immediate release of those detained 
against their will or isolated from a hostile environment either 
via coordinated negotiation or forcible recovery.318 
Given the current high-risk environments of not only Iraq 
and Afghanistan, but also of places like Colombia and other 
hostile zones around the globe, one might conclude that all 
personnel recovery operations will be conducted by either the 
Air Force or Special Operations Forces (SOF).319 This is not the 
case. While SOF forces provide flexibility as well as the unique 
knowledge and equipment required for high-risk, personnel 
recovery missions,320 there is no “dedicated” personnel recovery 
force. Based on each case, the Combatant Commander will rely 
on a combination of assets to form a rescue mission. The much-
publicized April 2003 rescue of Jessica Lynch does not represent 
the model for recovery operations,321 although in that personnel 
recovery operation SOF soldiers successfully rescued Private 
Jessica Lynch from an Iraqi hospital during a nighttime raid 
without suffering a single American casualty.322 
The use of the military to conduct personnel recovery 
missions is defined, in part, by the DOD policy on Non-
Conventional Assisted Recovery, which covers not only U.S. 
military personnel but also “DOD civilian employees, contractors 
and other designated personnel isolated during military 
318. See Tiron, supra note 308. 
319. See generally Jeffrey F. Addicott, The Role of Special Operations Forces in the 
War on Terror, in THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM 158 (John Davis ed., 2004). Congress 
created the United States Special Operations Command in 1987 to function as a 
separate unified command for all the services’ special operation forces. Id. “Often 
operating in secret, these uniquely selected and extremely well trained fighters are 
tasked to perform unique wartime and peacetime missions . . . .” Id. 
320. See Linda Robinson, The Silent Warriors, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 14, 
2003, at 28. 
321. See Keith B. Richburg, Iraqis Say Lynch Raid Faced No Resistance, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 15, 2003, at A17. Jessica Lynch, a supply clerk in the Army’s 507th 
Maintenance Company, was kidnapped on March 23, 2003 by Iraqi forces. Id. 
322. See Robert Wall, Rescue of a POW, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 14, 
2003, at 29 (describing the sophisticated and well-coordinated personnel recovery 
mission that included the use of aircraft not only to create a diversion, but also to 
provide close air support). 
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operations or as a direct result of developing or ongoing crisis 
prior to U.S. military intervention.”323 The significance of this 
DOD Instruction cannot be overstated for two reasons. First, the 
DOD Instruction specifically includes, by its terms, “contractors” 
as a covered entity without limitations or qualification (that is, 
under the terms of the contract).324 Second, the DOD 
Instruction’s applicability is broad—arguably, by using the term 
“military operations,” the policy accounts for personnel recovery 
operations in both war and MOOTW.325 As such, Non-
Conventional Assisted Recovery (NAR) encompasses: 
All forms of personnel recovery conducted by an entity, 
group of entities, or organizations that are trained and 
directed to contact, authenticate, support, move and 
exfiltrate U.S. military and other designated personnel 
from enemy-held or hostile areas to friendly control 
through established infrastructure procedures. NAR 
includes unconventional assisted recovery.326 
Though frequently the result of hostilities, personnel 
recovery options are not limited to hostilities per se: 
The scope of persons for whom the United States will 
undertake Personnel Recovery is not limited to 
situations involving hostile action or circumstances 
suggestive of hostile action. Personnel Recovery 
measures may be initiated for personnel (U.S., allied, or 
coalition) who become unaccounted for as a result of 
training exercises, operations other than war wherein 
hostile action is not involved and operational 
environments not involving hostile action.327 
Individuals who become missing as a result of nonhostile 
action do not automatically gain the benefits of personnel 
recovery operations initiated on their behalf.328 DOD policy 
323. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, INST. NO. 2310.6, NON-CONVENTIONAL ASSISTED 
RECOVERY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, para. 1 (2000). 
324. Id. 
325. See id. 
326. Id. para. 3. Unconventional Assisted Recovery is NAR conducted by Special 
Operations Forces. Id. 
327. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, INST. NO. 2310.5, ACCOUNTING FOR MISSING PERSONS 
para. E3.1.6 (2000). 
328. Id. 
ADDICOTT FINAL FORMATTED - EIC EDITS 3/6/2006 11:18 AM 
384 HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 28:2 
                                                          
provides that “the specific persons for whom Personnel Recovery 
may be initiated will vary based upon the circumstances unique 
to each situation.”329 
While the implementing regulations are the province of 
DOD, Congress has provided the statutory framework within 
which DOD conceptualizes and formulates personnel recovery 
policy specifically and missing person policy more generally. The 
Secretary of Defense established the Defense Prisoner of 
War/Missing Personnel Office pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1501: 
The Secretary of Defense shall establish within the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense an office to have 
responsibility for Department of Defense Policy relating 
to missing persons . . . . Subject to the authority, 
direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the 
responsibilities of the office shall include . . . policy, 
control, and oversight . . . of the entire process for 
investigation and recovery related to missing persons 
(including matters related to search, rescue, escape, 
and evasion) . . . .330 
The Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office 
(DPMO) is charged with coordinating the full range of policy 
issues associated with personnel recovery throughout DOD and 
the interagency community.331 
Perhaps more significantly for the civilian contractor, 
Congress defines the term “missing person” to mean: 
[A] member of the armed forces on active duty who is in 
a missing status; or a civilian employee of the 
Department of Defense or an employee of a contractor 
of the Department of Defense who serves in direct 
support of, or accompanies, the armed forces in the field 
under orders and who is in a missing status.332 
329. Id. 
330. 10 U.S.C. § 1501 (2000). 
331. See DPMO, supra note 3 (click on “DOD and DOS Cooperation on Personnel 
Recovery”); DPMO-Mission, http://www.dtic.mil/dpmo/leadership/mission.htm (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2006). 
332. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1513(1)(a)–(b) (2002). The term “missing status” is defined as 
“the status of a missing person who is determined to be absent in a category of any one of 
the following: [missing, missing in action, interned in a foreign country, captured, 
beleaguered, besieged, detained in a foreign country against that person’s will.]” Id. 
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Contractors are also considered “covered persons” for the 
purposes of DOD action to investigate the circumstances of their 
absence and, possibly, to evaluate and implement personnel 
recovery options.333 As a result, 10 § U.S.C 1502 states: 
After receiving information that the whereabouts and 
status of a [covered] person. . .is uncertain and that the 
absence of the person may be involuntary, the 
commander of the unit, facility, or area to or in which 
the person is assigned shall make a preliminary 
assessment of the circumstances. If, as a result of that 
assessment, the commander concludes that the person 
is missing, the commander shall . . . recommend that 
the person be placed in missing status[ ] and . . . 
transmit a report containing that recommendation to 
the Secretary concerned . . . .334 
The application of the statute to personnel recovery provides 
some overarching bright-lines and the opportunity for 
Congressional supervision, but does not limit or preclude the 
need for more clarification of personnel recovery vis-à-vis the 
specific and increasingly important role of the contractor.335 
VII. CONCLUSION 
We have yet to know the full extent of contractor activity across 
the interagency in high-risk overseas locations around the world 
on any given day.336 
IDA Report 
 
There can be no doubt that the use of civilian contractors by 
the modern U.S. military is an absolute necessity for successful 
mission accomplishment. This is certainly true in the context of 
the War on Terror, but also in other contingency operations from 
South America to the Far East. Unfortunately, “the regulatory 
§ 1513(2). 
333. Id. § 1501(c)(2). 
334. Id. § 1502. 
335. See DFARS, supra note 51, § 252.225-7040(n) (setting out the duties of the 
parent contracting company to notify next of kin in the event a contractor dies or is 
“missing, captured, or abducted”). 
336. IDA Report, supra note 23, at F-5. 
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scheme governing civilians accompanying the force is in a rapid 
state of flux”337 and DOD lacks a “comprehensive policy to ensure 
that contractors are adequately protected . . . or that the risks to 
them are adequately managed in high-threat, overseas 
locations.”338 In fact, most of the regulatory guidance dealing 
with civilians accompanying the military was written prior to 
the War on Terror.339 
At the time of writing this article, the U.S. House of 
Representatives has recognized a number of the shortcomings in 
the areas of civilian contractors and personnel recovery, and 
have taken steps to address some of these gaps with House Bill 
1815.340 In a military appropriations bill introduced by 
Representative Duncan Hunter of California on April 26, 2005, 
one section of the bill recognizes the necessity of contractor 
support on the battlefield and offers clarification and definition 
of the roles of contractors and the military in light of current 
exigencies. Section 1603 provides much needed definitions of 
terms such as “contractor[s] accompanying the force”341 and 
“contractor[s] not accompanying the force.”342 Additionally, the 
bill orders the Secretary of Defense to work closely with 
commanders of combatant command to determine the proper 
protection levels needed to protect all types of battlefield 
contractors.343 Moreover, the bill sets up a communication and 
337. LEGAL LESSONS LEARNED FROM AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ, VOL. I, CENTER FOR 
LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 172 (2004); see also Jonathan Finer, Security 
Contractors in Iraq Under Scrutiny After Shootings, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2005, at A1 
(discussing the increasing scrutiny over the actions of security contractors in Iraq after a 
number of incidents involving “indiscriminate shootings and other recklessness [that] 
have given rise to charges of inadequate oversight”). For example, Brig. Gen. Karl R. 
Horst, the deputy commander of the Third Infantry Division, noted that “there’s no 
authority over [security contractors], so you can’t come down on them hard when they 
escalate force.” Id. One hopes that a more clearly defined regulatory scheme will benefit 
both the military, who will no longer have to futilely police the actions of contractors 
outside of their realm of authority, and contractors in Iraq, who have grown increasingly 
restless in the wake of violence against contractors in the last two years in Iraq. 
338. IDA Report, supra note 23, at F-1. 
339. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
340. H.R. 1815 109th Cong. (2005). 
341. See H.R. 1815, 109th Cong. §§ 1603(a)(1)–(2). 
342. Id. 
343. See H.R. 1815, 109th Cong. § 1604(a)(1). 
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intelligence-sharing framework between military command and 
contractors to ensure that all parties are aware of, and prepared 
for, all threats and contingencies that arise in a war zone.344 The 
bill even empowers the Secretary of Defense to enact regulations 
that govern civilian contractors’ ability to carry and use certain 
weapons for self-defense and while performing contract work.345 
The proposals enumerated in the bill are all positive steps in the 
right direction; however, there is far more that needs to be done. 
As one commentator recently noted, House Bill 1815 “merely 
creates an accounting of private contractors—not accountability 
for private contractors and their parent companies.”346 
Another encouraging development in terms of advancing the 
issues associated with civilian contractors is the June 2005 
DFARS.347 This DFARS addresses questions regarding 
governmental responsibility to contractors deployed on 
contingency operations overseas, defining their duties in 
relation to DOD and setting out specific required language in all 
such contracts.348 Likewise, the October 2005 DOD Instruction 
3020.41 created a comprehensive source for the DOD procedures 
dealing with CDF.349 This dialogue is encouraging, but more 
needs to be done. 
Mitigating the risk of capture or injury to civilian 
contractors is a shared responsibility of the United States and 
the parent contracting company. Not only does DOD need to 
fully develop an institutional approach to contractor force 
protection, it is imperative that parent contracting companies 
develop a better system of providing the necessary AT training 
to their employees that are sent to high-risk overseas locations. 
Until the government develops a systemic approach350 (that is, 
344. Id. 
345. See H.R. 1815, 109th Cong. § 1605(a). 
346. Marc P. Miles, Speech Given at the Contractors on the Battlefield Conference, 
San Antonio, Texas (June 28, 2005) (on file with Author). 
347. See DFARS, supra note 51. 
348. See id. 
349. See DOD INST. 3020.41, supra note 17, at para. 6. 
350. See generally Kahn & Schwartz, supra note 165 (discussing the lack of a 
systemic manner to deal with the growing violence in Iraq); Finer, supra note 289 
(reporting on the growing concern that lack of oversight is leading to recklessness and 
lawlessness by certain security contractors in Iraq). 
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providing the full range of force protection training at military 
pre-deployment sites), the prudent parent contracting company 
will ensure that their personnel have the necessary information 
to prepare them for the exigencies of their overseas 
assignments. At a minimum this means that the parent 
company should include an appropriate level of AT training so 
that contractors are better able to avoid or survive capture 
and/or injury when operating in high-risk environments. 
 


